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Abstract 
 
 
This dissertation was written in the context of the pre-salt findings and the 
consequential business opportunities that these discoveries represented for the 
offshore industry. The authors, throughout their Master studies, were exposed to 
lectures and participated in discussions with professionals from the Offshore and 
Shipping industries and with academics from such areas.  
The authors identified, during such interactions, the lack of literature focusing 
in the internationalization to emerging offshore markets. The opportunities of gains 
presented by pre-salt basins’ countries are vast, however equally are the 
challenges, as business practices and conditions varied deeply from the investors’ 
home countries. Therefore, this work aims at developing a risk assessment that 
could be used for companies and academics when evaluating internationalization to 
Brazil and Angola, where some of the biggest pre-salt discoveries were made in 
recent years.  
The research methods focused on literature review and case studies 
approach, alongside interviews and participation in seminars and company 
presentations. The interviews were performed with professionals, from academic 
and corporate sectors, who had been in contact with the oil and gas industry in 
Angola or Brazil, or both. 
The authors believe that the main contribution of this work is the development 
of a seminal risk assessment framework for companies aiming to internationalize to 
the offshore industry in emerging markets. The findings and the proposed 
assessment are presented after a detailed analysis of each country. The biggest 
research limitation was the lack of scientific literature and available financial data 
from companies, which rendered the research design of this work qualitative. The 
authors invite other academics and professionals to expand the proposed 
framework and continue the production of scientific papers that focus on the pre-salt 
opportunities. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 General Overview 
In recent years, one of the major oil discoveries made globally were the pre-
salt basins in Brazil. Giant semi-public energy corporation Petrobras announced, in 
2007, the discovery of oil fields that could potentially add an average of one million 
barrels a day to the country’s production by 2017. (Energy Information 
Administration, 2013) The pre-salt oil field named Lula, and afterwards renamed as 
Tupi, was the first of a sequence of discoveries of pre-salt basins.  
The pre-salt layer is a large deposit of oil located beneath the Brazilian 
seabed, with a volume of approximately 50 billion barrels, and comprises a range of 
800 km between the states of Espírito Santo and Santa Catarina, away from 100-
300 km from the coast.  (Petrobras, 2014) The basins are located between 5 and 7 
km below the sea floor, under an extensive layer of 2km of salt, as it is shown by the 
graph below, from Petrobras. In 2010, Petrobras also confirmed the commerciality 
of the pre-salt discoveries, waving away claims that the exploration of such fields 
would not be profitable. (Agência Nacional do Petróleo, 2014) 
 
Image 1: Brazilian pre-salt Charts (Petrobras, 2014) 
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The drilling of the Tupi 1 well, in the deep waters of the Santos Basin, 
confirmed the existence of massive oil reserves underneath the salt layer. This 
event drew great attention to companies operating in the other side of the Atlantic 
Ocean, namely in the Angolan coast which is exactly juxtaposed to the coastal 
region of Brazil where the pre salt discoveries had been made. 
Under the continental drift theory, it is understood that Angola and Brazil 
were joined, therefore having identical geological formations in their mutual coast. 
As the continents separated 130 million years ago, began the formation of a rift 
valley, which contained deposits of plants and animal materials. The salt layer 
served as a seal, keeping the deposits secure.  (Koning, 2014)  
Therefore, in the time of the pre salt discoveries in Brazil, the geological 
similarities between the continental margins of the countries aroused the interest of 
oil companies to explore oil fields in Angola, which could potentially be pre-salt 
fields.  (Krill, 2009) 
 
Image 2: Atlantic Rift and Pre-salt fields (Energy Information Administration, 
2013) 
 
In 2011, Sonangol - Angola’s national oil company -  awarded 11 pre-salt 
blocks in a limited bidding for international oil companies. In the same year, Danish 
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oil company Maersk Oil had already started operations in the Kwansa basin, 
exploring deep waters. In 2012, the company finally announced the flow of 3,000 
bpd from pre-salt wells. To this, followed other announcements from companies 
such as Cobalt International, ensuring the success of exploration of deep waters in 
Angola.  (Sonangol, 2014) 
 The exploration of the pre-salt layer, however, poses many challenges, as it 
is located in very deep waters. The vessels and equipment required for such 
operations have higher technological demands than usual. They must be resistant 
to high temperatures, corrosion and pressure, amongst other. For the moment, 
neither country seems to possess local sourced technology that would be able to fit 
such demands, resulting in a market even more attractive for foreign companies 
who intend to expand overseas.  
The discovery of the new fields also presses for more vessels to service the 
exploration. DOF points that, until 2020, Brazil will need to double its fleet in order to 
fully service the expected explorations. This would represent a need of more than 
200 vessels in the next ten years. (DOF, 2013) 
1.2 Research Question 
As stated before, the pre salt basins discovery has changed the trends of 
global oil markets, attracting a lot of attention to Brazil and Angola. Due to the 
magnitude of these discoveries, both markets have become very difficult to ignore 
for foreign companies. As the countries are two of the biggest deep-water regions, 
offshore and subsea service companies have identified in Brazil and Angola 
opportunities to grow their business. However, the challenges of entering such 
markets are also hard to ignore. 
Internationalization of business, especially towards emerging markets, is very 
risky. Gains can be high, but so can be losses. As many companies expand, one of 
the questions they have to face is where to expand their business, what are the 
main requirements and which factors to take into account when considering growing 
their business overseas. Therefore, this work focuses in assessing such issues and 
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trying to create support for offshore companies who wish to undergo an international 
expansion to either Angola or Brazil and gain from the pre-salt opportunities. 
The main difficulty faced during the research and development of this work 
was the lack of available data from companies who currently operate in both 
markets. Most companies do not publish their revenues per geographic location nor 
do they reveal the evolution of their earnings and expenditures in the early years of 
establishing business in Angola or Brazil. In order to surpass such challenge, the 
authors decided to face the matter from a qualitative approach, focusing on reports 
from professionals who have worked in the offshore industry in both countries or 
who have researched the topic. Interviews were also performed with such 
professionals, in order to obtain more detailed narrations and experiences. The 
authors also did extensive secondary research, analyzing each country’s legislation 
and development plans, especially for the energetic sector. In order to assure 
credibility and correct information, most documents were assessed in their original 
language (Portuguese for both countries). The proposition of an assessment 
framework for such markets is innovative for this type of work, as there is a lack of 
data and scientific production in the subject. For this reason, the available data was 
limited. 
As an end-result, the authors expect that the work will propose a 
methodology to be followed by companies who plan to take part in the pre salt 
business opportunities, focusing specially in the Brazilian and Angolan basins. The 
risk assessment presented will be a framework that research professionals in 
offshore companies can take into account when considering which market to tap 
into.  
The main purpose of the framework is to present the key decision factors to 
take into consideration when setting up business in the Brazilian and Angolan 
offshore markets. The authors will categorize each decision factor, proposing a risk 
assessment methodology. The authors believed that the organization and 
presentation of such categorization would be relevant for offshore professionals who 
are analyzing an internationalization process.  
Throughout the participation in seminars and offshore industry events, the 
authors noticed companies lacked bibliographic insights and strategies when 
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analyzing how to move to emerging markets. However, there is a growing trend of 
internationalization in the oil and gas field and an expansion of academic graduate 
and post-graduate studies that focus on the energy field in general. So, the present 
work is also a way to provide companies with an initial assessment tool to measure 
whether the risk of moving abroad is manageable or not, as they become familiar 
with the most important decision factors to take into consideration in the early 
stages of internationalization.  
So, the authors believe that it is important to start the discussion and stimulate 
the production of academic literature, which may be relevant for practical application 
for businesses around the world and to academics that wish to pursue their studies 
in this field. There are many challenges in writing about a relatively new topic, the 
lack of available information and use cases being one of the most defying. 
Nonetheless, it is possible to overcome such difficulties and start a debate.  
The authors believe that this work will be relevant for academics and students 
interested in better understanding the many challenges of internationalization in 
developing markets. Furthermore, this work will give professionals of the offshore 
industry an overview of some of the risks to be taken into account when considering 
an expansion abroad. 
Finally, the authors also believe that the risk assessment methodology 
proposed will be an interesting international strategy framework for the oil and gas 
industries. As mentioned before, this field of academic research is still under-
developed and therefore, the presentation of something original is an important step 
to stimulate further discussion and production of academic papers. 
1.3 Organization of Chapters 
 The plan of this work is as follows. The following section, number 2, will 
present the methodological framework that will serve as a basis for the authors’ final 
risk analysis. Sections 3 and 4 present an overall review on both countries, namely 
Brazil and Angola.  
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For each country a general macroeconomic and financial analysis will be 
presented. However, the main focus will be on their respective energy scenario – 
focused on the oil and gas sectors - and the participation of the oil and gas sector in 
the country’s economy and international trade. Finally, an overview of each 
country’s law and regulations, combined with a description of both countries’ 
challenges on corruption and policies. It is important to bear in mind that all these 
information will be focused on the offshore and oil industry, which is the topic of this 
work. The main purpose of both chapters is to give an overall presentation of each 
country and the requirements and procedures companies will have to meet in order 
to enter the Brazilian and Angolan market. Again, such data will be re-assessed as 
we present our risk analysis. 
Section 5 will focus on the risk assessment in itself, with a further 
development of the methodology presented in Section 2. The risk assessment will 
be used as a framework to evaluate the risks of moving to the Angolan or Brazilian 
offshore markets. The general criteria to be assessed will be presented throughout 
the work itself. In Section 6, case studies based on interviews and research 
performed will simulate a practical application of the risk assessment framework 
proposed by the authors. 
Finally, in section 7 an overall conclusion and presentation of the findings will 
be done in order to present to companies how to best make use of the framework 
and give an overview of the findings. 
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2. Theoretical Methodology 
2.1 Foreign Direct Investment 
 In today's globalization, the developing and transition economies have 
become the foremost to liberalize their foreign regimes and pursue policies to attract 
foreign investment. According to the OECD Benchmark definition of Foreign Direct 
Investment (1996) FDI indicates the objective of a direct investor,(noted as Foreign 
Company along the text) entity resident in one economy, in obtaining a long-term 
relationship with an entity resident in an economy other than that of the investor. 
Direct investment involves both the initial transaction between the two entities and 
all subsequent capital transactions between them and among affiliated enterprises; 
both incorporated and unincorporated (OECD Publications, 1996). 
 The decision making process for firms to go abroad involves as a first step 
the identification of an opportunity of investment in the host economy. In the present 
section, the authors present a useful framework for the analysis of firms' pursuing to 
establish their operations abroad. The motives for internationalization are many, 
such as a saturated home market, the presence in a certain country granting access 
to strategic resources or the existence cluster effects to be explored in a specific 
region.  
 In this chapter, the reader is introduced to the theories and terms related to 
foreign direct investments and the factors that shape the firm decision making to 
engage in FDI model. Starting from Dunning (1993) and his development on the 
eclectic paradigm for explaining foreign direct investment (FDI) choices of 
production companies. Originally the eclectic paradigm consisted of firm specific 
ownership, localization and internalization advantages, also know as the OLI-model 
(Dunning, 1988). In 1993 Dunning added the motives for FDI, distinguishing four 
kinds of FDI: market seeking, resource seeking, efficiency seeking and strategic 
resource seeking. These categories of motives constitute the base on which part of 
this investigation is built upon. 
 12 
 In general terms, before firms carry out the decision making process to carry 
out an international strategy, they must identify an opportunity which can be grasped 
outside the home country. Once this opportunity has been identified, a twofold 
decision is logically implied in the "cherry picking" strategy (Rentocchini, Marzetti, & 
Franco, 2008). 
 i). Choice among the relevant alternatives: these are all the available different 
means the firm can exploit in order to seize the opportunity and they strongly 
depend on the kind of opportunity at stake. As an example of this, if the firm is 
interested in gaining access to a foreign market, then FDI, exports and patent 
licenses are some of the alternatives the firm can decide upon building its entry 
strategy. Yet, if the firm's main interest is to take advantage from low cost foreign 
labor, it can select between FDI and international outsourcing. Certainly, the motives 
underlying the decision process not only affect the basket of entry alternatives but 
also the way factors such as exchange rate or infrastructure drive the decision 
among the alternatives. Those factors prompting firms to choose FDI are defined as 
internalization determinants.  
ii). Location Choice: these are basically the factors affecting the choice of the 
country in which the firm invests. Choosing an accurate location is important when a 
company gains from its presence in a given market by benefiting from conditions 
such as: special tax regimes; lower production and transport costs; market size; 
access to protected markets, and lower risk (Dunning and Lundan, 2008). Market 
imperfections (e.g., the imbalance of international allocation of resources) can be 
reduced by internalizing operations, allowing a reduction in transaction costs 
associated with risks of copying technology, among others (Dunning, 2002). The 
choice of a particular location is therefore based on specific conditions that are in its 
favor (Ietto-Gilles, 2005).  
 Subsequently, the classification of FDI determinants just mentioned is useful 
only when it is based on the underpinning motives, as the latter can significantly 
affect levels and patterns of international trade, FDI contribution to economic 
development and the amount and direction of productivity spillovers.  The most cited 
taxonomy of FDI motives is built upon the OLI paradigm described by Dunning 
(1993) and distinguished four kinds of FDI: 
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2.1.1 Resource Seeking 
 The resource-asset seeking firms are motivated to invest abroad to acquire 
specific resources at a lower cost than could be obtained in their home country. 
Dunning distinguishes three types of resource seekers: (a) Those seeking physical 
resources such as raw materials and agricultural products; (b) Those seeking cheap 
unskilled or semi-skilled labour; (c) Those seeking technological capacity, 
management or marketing expertise and organizational skills (Dunning, 1993, p. 
37). 
2.1.2 Market Seeking 
 The market-seeking FDI aims at penetrating the local markets of host 
countries and is usually connected with: market size and per capita income, market 
growth, access to regional and global markets, consumer preferences and structure 
of domestic market. In addition there are four main reasons for which market-
seeking firms may undertake foreign investment: (a) A firm's main supplier or 
customer may expand overseas, and in order to retain its business, the firm needs 
to follow them; (b) A firm might need to adapt its product to the local taste and 
specific market requirements, which can only be achieved through market presence 
in the form of FDI; (c) Production and transaction cost of serving a local market from 
an adjacent facility might be lower then when supplying the market from a distance; 
(d) A firm may consider it necessary, as part of its global strategy, to have physical 
presence in the leading market served by its competitors (Dunning, 1993).  
2.1.3 Efficiency Seekers 
 The motivation of efficiency seeking foreign direct investors is to rationalize 
their production, distribution and marketing activities through common governance 
and a synergy building among geographically dispersed operations. Such 
rationalization essentially stems from two sources: the advantages in the cost of 
endowments between countries, and the economies of scale and scope (Dunning, 
1993, p. 59-60). This efficiency-seeking FDI creates new sources of 
competitiveness for firms and it goes where the costs of production are lower.  
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2.1.4 Strategic Resource Seeking 
 The strategic asset seekers are those firms that engage in FDI to promote 
their strategic objectives, usually those of sustaining or enhancing their international 
competitiveness.  The firm's main aim is to capitalize of the advantages of common 
ownership of a network of activities and capabilities in diverse environments 
(Dunning, 1993, p. 59-60). 
2.1.5 Development of Theories 
 The development of theories of the multinational enterprise dates back to 
1971 with the theory of capital flows by Caves. His theory argues that headquarter 
activities should be placed by the enterprise in capital abundant countries with 
subsidiaries in capital-scarce countries, giving no motives for FDI to occur between 
identical countries.1 In addition, the traditional theories of international trade 
reiterated that a country has a competitive advantage over other countries in the 
form of a good or service that is produced at a lower cost than by any other country. 
This competitive advantage aroused from inherent factors, such as natural 
resources or climate. 
 Subsequently, the "New trade theory" appeared, affirming that a comparative 
advantage is not just derived from natural differences in resources, but rather the 
economies of scale and network effects as substantial determinants of international 
trade patterns. Later on, the theory of the multinationals enterprise was split into two 
parts: Horizontal and Vertical FDI. 
 In essence, there are two main reasons for companies to become 
multinationals: To serve a foreign market and to get lower cost of inputs. This is the 
main characteristic to differentiate between the two types of FDI: horizontal and 
vertical. Firms introduce horizontal FDI by duplicating the manufacturing of its 
products and services in different countries. This FDI mechanism emerges, as it is 
too costly for the firm to serve the foreign market by exports due to trade barriers 
and transportation cost.   
                                                
1 See "Theories of the multinational firm" by Dunning (1977) and Caves (1996) 
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 In contrast, vertical FDI refers to firms that fragment geographically the 
production process. The concept behind this type of FDI is that a production process 
requires several stages with different input requirements; hence if the prices for 
those inputs vary across borders, it becomes profitable for the firm to outsource 
some production stages abroad.  
 In order to understand better these two concepts, the following are the most 
prominent definitions for vertical and horizontal FDI used in the literature: 
1. Motivation of investment: FDI is classified to be vertical or horizontal depending 
on the motive for affiliate operations. Thus, vertical FDI is conducted in order to 
benefit from factor price differences between countries (Hanson, Mataloni, & 
Slaughter, 2003). 
2. Factor Proportion: this second way to differentiate the two types of FDI is 
proposed by Brainard (1993a), whom by utilizing the empirical estimations of 
international trade flows, explains the reasons for multinationals to carry out foreign 
investment.  
3. The third definition is done by Lankes and Venables (1997) whom use the 
geographical distribution of sales as a cause for a multinational to establish a 
foreign affiliate.  
4. The last definition is developed by Markusen (1995) who defines vertical FDI as a 
geographical separation of the production process by stages.  
2.1.6 Motives determining FDI in Brazil and Angola  
 Before carrying out the decision making process to execute an international 
strategy, companies need to identify the opportunity presented outside the home 
country. As the authors presented above, in Brazil and Angola the recent pre-salt 
discoveries introduce the need of companies that can provide the necessary 
technology and services as part of the exploration activities. Hence, this thesis 
presents the location of choice to be made between Brazil and Angola.  
 As part of the choice among the relevant alternatives, firms interested in 
serving one of these two markets may select the method of entry as FDI, exports 
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and patent licenses. Yet, the analysis performed by the authors is meant for 
companies seeking to perform FDI in one of the countries.  According to the theory 
described in chapter 2, the OLI paradigm by Dunning (1993) distinguishes four kinds 
of FDI. Nonetheless, the main reasons for firms to invest in Brazil and Angola rely 
on resource and market seeking motives. This is because firms motivated to invest 
in these countries seek for physical resources but also aim to penetrate the Brazilian 
and Angolan local and regional markets. 
 The following is a summarized graph of the market drivers for companies to 
evaluate FDI in Brazil and Angola: 
 
Image 3: Market Drivers (Developed by authors) 
 Nonetheless, theoretical and empirical studies on FDI have shown that the 
determinants influencing the location of choice of investment by multinational firms 
are also associated to the firm-level characteristics as well as the country-level 
characteristics (either home country characteristics or host country characteristics). 
Yeaple (2009) proposes theoretically that countries with a more favorable 
environment in terms of larger market size and smaller fixed cost attract a larger 
number of multinational companies. The authors believe that as part of the firm's 
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investment decision-making process, defining the country's risk profile is imperative 
for the level of business risk firms would face in the host economy. 
 Hence, the authors selected the Risk Management Framework presented by 
Terje Aven and Jan Erik Vinnem in their book "Risk Management - with Applications 
from the Offshore Petroleum Industry" to analyze the risk, uncertainties and possible 
consequences for firms evaluating to invest in Brazil in Angola offshore industry.  
2.2 Risk Assessment Framework 
 Nowadays, various industries are implementing risk management in their 
organizations. This is due to the high expectations from the managerial perspective 
as developing a proper risk framework is key for obtaining high levels of 
performance.  
 In order to support the decision-making on designing operations, 
organizations conduct risk analysis, identifying hazards and threats and its proper 
risk description. The totality of the analyses and the evaluations are referred to as 
risk assessments (Aven and Vinnem, 2007). Once the risk assessment is 
performed, it is followed by the risk treatment, a process to develop and implement 
measures to modify the risk, either by designing ways to avoid, reduce, transfer or 
retain the risk.  
 Based on ISO 2005, the purpose of risk management is to manage and 
control an organization with regards to risk. This includes the definition of 
management policies, procedures and practices to establishing the existent context, 
assessing, treating, monitoring, reviewing and communicating risks, see figure 1. 
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Image 4: Risk Framework (Aven & Vinnem, Risk Management with 
Applications from the Offshore Petroleum Industry, 2007) 
 Due to the nature of the research question, the authors have chosen to 
analyze their findings through the framework proposed by Aven and Vinnem, which 
aim to help organizations develop a framework for risk management and decision- 
making under uncertainty.  
 Aven and Vinnem defined risk as the combination of the two basic 
dimensions: a) possible consequences and b) associated uncertainties. The 
purpose of this framework is to give a detail overview on the assessment of 
uncertainties and the different views of how these uncertainties can be dealt with.  
 For MNEs moving to emerging markets, the choice of the country in which to 
invest requires the capacity of making decisions under uncertain conditions. 
Throughout this work, several aspects of the Brazilian and Angolan offshore and oil 
markets will be presented. However, the specific traits of each particular company 
wishing to expand their business overseas cannot be reported or fully taken into 
consideration, as they vary from company to company. 
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 Therefore, we aim to propose the tools to firms to assess the risks and 
uncertainties of each market and consequently reach a decision towards starting 
operations in a particular country. It is important to keep in mind that “risk analysis 
does not give direct answers as to what is the correct solution and measure, but it 
only gives a risk description that will provide a basis for the choice of solutions or 
measures” (Aven, 2008). In other words, applying to the case of this thesis, the 
assessment through the proposed framework acts as basis to establish the next 
steps in the process of overseas expansions to Angola or Brazil, not being in itself a 
solution or strategy alone. 
 The framework allows the assessment of the risks inherent to such 
expansion and how to take into account the different aspects of decision-making in 
a risky scenario. As risk still remains tied to uncertainty, there is no absolute risk 
avoidance, or an absolute correct path. There is, however, the systematization and 
study of risks related to a specific process, in order to reach an overall conclusion to 
serve as basis for reaching a decision. (Aven, Risk Analysis, 2008) 
First and foremost, it’s necessary to identify the steps required to build a 
framework. According to Aven & Vinnem (2007), the main elements of creating a 
risk assessment framework may be identified as: 
• The definition of the decision-making problems;  
• The concerns that affect the analysis and the values attributed to such 
concerns; 
• The managerial review of such problems;  
• And finally the execution of the decision. 
 Therefore, the basic processes behind the framework building blocks are the 
following steps: identifying a risk/uncertainty, the possible consequences and how to 
manage such risks, if possible.  
 The analysis of a possible risk/uncertainty will provide decision support, by 
contrasting expected values and the real observations. For example, when 
considering the Brazilian supply chain, it is possible to observe that expected time 
frameworks are actually not respected, as processes take longer than usual. (Doing 
Business in Brazil, Subsea Focus) Therefore, it is important to have an 
understanding of the business scenario of the market in order to contrast the 
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expectation to actual observations from those present in the market. 
 So, in order to build a framework, first some concepts must be presented: 
Risk or vulnerability: the risk of an activity is the combination of possible 
consequences and their associated uncertainties (Lillestøl, 2012) Risk = (C,U) 
Where: C= consequences of the activity, U = uncertainties regarding C. Given that C 
may be expressed as an interval defined of various possible values or variables or 
one possible value or variable in itself. 
Note: a high uncertainty may not necessarily mean a high risk, as the risk is defined 
by the combination of the possible consequences of such uncertainty.  
Decision problems: the specific problems and alternatives presented in a decision-
making process. These decision problems may be evaluated, from standard to 
complex. (Aven & Vinnem, Risk Management with Applications from the Offshore 
Petroleum Industry, 2007) 
Manageability of risk: this concept relates to the potential of reducing risk over time. 
For example, some high risks are also highly manageable, consequently being less 
problematic then low risks that have a very low degree of manageability. 
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Image 5: Risk x Manageability (Aven & Vinnem, Risk Management with 
Applications from the Offshore Petroleum Industry, 2007) 
 The figure presented above is the framework developed by Avin and Vinnen 
to illustrate manageability of risk. In the figure, alternative 1 gives a medium risk 
level and low manageability, whereas alternative 2 gives a higher risk but also a 
higher manageability. Thus by selecting alternative 2 a higher risk is initially 
assigned, but it provides a large opportunity for reducing the risk and obtaining good 
safety performance (by adopting a good safety management).   
Selection of Method for Risk-Informed Decision Assessment:  
 In order to evaluate the alternatives, a characterization method has been 
developed by Aven and Vinnem. This method allows defining the type of decision 
problem in question, as some decisions are critical and require detailed analysis 
whist others are not so critical, hence a basic analysis may be sufficient.  
 The objective of this characterization process is to recognize the most 
efficient decision process for the relevant decision problem, using a structured and 
standardized progression that ensures the quality and the documentation of the 
decision process (Aven & Vinnem, Risk Management with Applications from the 
Offshore Petroleum Industry, 2007). The following are the three main categories of 
decision problem:  
(1) Standard decision problem: this category is characterized by limited expected 
loss/gain  and limited uncertainties. However no external assistance is needed. 
(2) Advanced decision problem: this category is characterized by significant 
expected  loss/gain and significant uncertainties. There is a need for detailed 
analysis and external  expertise will be required.   
 (3) Complex decision problem: this category is characterized by large expected 
loss/gain and large uncertainties. Not only a detailed analysis is required but also 
experienced people engaged in the process. 
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Table 1: Decision Problem Categorization (Aven & Vinnem, Risk 
Management with Applications from the Offshore Petroleum Industry, 2007) 
 As a basis to carry out the categorization, a set of features linked to the 
expected consequences and uncertainties is defined. The ranking of each category 
is made according to the specific situation. The expected values (standard, 
advanced or complex) for each matter serve as a starting point for the company to 
assess the importance of both the decision problems and the uncertainties. In order 
to carry out a categorization, the authors will define the decision problems based on 
the country analyses to be performed under section 3 and 4. Finally, the following 
table will be used as a means of summarizing findings. Please see table 2. 
  Ranking Argument Comment 
 Decision 
Problems 
Standard Advanced  Complex 
  Comments are 
support for the 
ranking of 
decision 
problems 
Feature 1 
   
  
Feature 2 
   
  
Feature 3 
   
  
Table 2: Classification of Decision Problems Adapted (Aven, Risk Analysis, 
2008) 
The characterization presented above provides the company a base to 
determine the classification of the problem. If the dimension shows a high score, it 
Decision 
Problem 
 Expected 
Loss/Gain 
External Assistance 
Standard Low Not needed 
Advanced Significant Needed 
Complex Large Detailed Analysis required 
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means that the problem is classified as complex, whereas with low scores implies is 
a standard decision problem.  
 The next step the framework follows is the evaluation of alternatives and how 
to analyze the different approaches for each decision problem. Yet, this is not a 
topic the authors will cover in this thesis, as the main concern is to define a proper 
risk assessment for the offshore industry for Brazil and Angola. The future 
alternative companies may bear is another question, which may be studied as a 
separate subject and the authors advise that each company studies it individually, 
taking into considering the particularities of their business, strategy and corporate 
culture. 
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3. Brazil 
In this section, an overview of the key aspects of the Brazilian economic, 
financial, legal and political scenario will be presented. The focus will be centered on 
the oil and offshore industry, regarding legal particularities and participation of the 
sector in the Brazilian economy. 
3.1 General Macroeconomic and Financial Scenario 
Brazil is the world’s seventh largest economy, with a gross domestic product 
of US$ 2,245 trillion (World Bank, 2014), having briefly overtaken the United 
Kingdom as the world’s sixth largest economy in 2012. The country represents, 
therefore, a global economic power and has managed to sustain growth at a 
moderate level even throughout the 2008 and 2009 international financial crisis. In 
an overall scenario, the country is benefiting from improvements in social welfare 
and income distribution; relatively low inflation and a stable economic growth. 
However, Brazil’s GDP growth slowed significantly in the last years, driven by both 
internal and external factors. 
 
Image 6: Brazil GDP Fluctuation (CIA World Factbook, 2014) 
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Uncertainty marks Brazil’s current macroeconomic scenario. Although it 
ranks amongst the BRICs, emerging economies that see rapid growth, Brazil has 
not had GDP growth rates as high as China and India, two countries it has been 
often compared to. 
In 2014, the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE), Brazilian 
Institute of Geography and Statistics, published that the country’s GDP contracted 
0.9% year-on-year in the second trimester; in a quarter-on quarter adjusted basis, 
the contraction was of 0.6%. This retraction follows a certain trend in the GDP 
growth of the country, characterized by a slow pace. 
 During the year of 2013, inflation surpassed the targets sets by Banco 
Central do Brasil (Bacen), Brazil’s Central Bank. The set target of 4.5%, with a 
permitted band of fluctuation of plus or minus 2%, was surpassed throughout the 
year, even surpassing it’s upper limit of 6.5% at the month of March. To contain the 
issue, Bacen has increased interest rates and inflation has been considered under 
control by the government. However, popular discontent shows that, from the 
perspective of the market, there are still uncertainties towards the inflation’s 
contingency. (Empresa de Pesquisa Energética, 2014)  
Economic policy in 2013 was directed towards accelerating growth and 
keeping inflation in check, under conditions of high external volatility, especially 
given the expected changes in United States monetary policy. The first change in 
Brazil’s macroeconomic variables occurred as the central bank raised the Special 
System of Clearance and Custody (SELIC) basic interest rate from April 2013 
onwards. Accordingly, the rate climbed from 7.25% to 10.0% between September 
2012 and December 2013. This measure was designed to contain annual inflation 
and bring it below the 6.5% ceiling of its target range, and to achieve convergence 
towards the center of the range at 4.5%. The cumulative inflation rate was 5.8% in 
the 12 months to October, and 4.38% in the first ten months of 2013. (Empresa de 
Pesquisa Energética, 2014) 
Despite the macroeconomic scenario of slow growth, Brazil has been able to 
improve its social indicators. The unemployment rate in October 2013 was at 5.2% 
(Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2013). Also, 
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according to IBGE (2011), the gap between the country’s richest and poorest has 
decreased in all 27 administrative units with an average of 11.5% in the country. 
Such increase of purchasing power and ascension to the middle class has been 
very important in Brazil, a country known for its social inequalities. However, the 
changes are still seen as incipient by most of the population.  
The country has a diversified trade portfolio, the top export commodities 
being: ores (13.7%), oil & mineral fuels (10.91%), oil seeds (7.2%), industrial 
machinery (5.72%), meat (5.65%), motor vehicles & parts (5.18%) and iron & steel 
(4.42%). (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2014) The variety in the country’s 
export portfolio makes it less vulnerable to external risks and price shocks. So, the 
country has not become dependent on the petroleum sector in its balance of trade. 
As Brazil also has an active industrial sector and a population with a strong power of 
purchase, the country consumes big part of the oil it produces. 
Although there are any many bottlenecks in infrastructure, especially in ports, 
there is also a strong growth in investment in the civil construction sector. Currently, 
the country has large housing development programs led by the government and 
also governmental infrastructure programs, focused in distribution and generation of 
electricity, increase of railways and highways and the modernization and 
construction of airports and ports. In Rio de Janeiro, a subsea cluster has become 
part of the agenda, as the offshore industry grows and faces several bottlenecks in 
ports. In Espirito Santo, also part of the pre-salt basin, major ports are under 
developing, one of them, led by Singaporean company Jurong already in the 
construction phases. The licensing process, however, is long, which retards the 
progress. The Port of Rottterdam Authority has, since 2012, been heading the 
development of what should be Latin’s America greatest privately owned port, 
designed to supply oil and iron ore demands. The negotiations are still stopped, as 
environmental license bureaucracy is delaying the start of construction. 
 The Brazilian financial sector is well developed. Since the 1960s, several 
reforms were made in the country in order to perfect the financial institutions, 
triggered by the Reform of 1964, which created Brazil’s Central Bank, responsible 
for issuing the currency. Throughout its evolution, the financial system has suffered 
many changes and the country has also undergone several currency changes. The 
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Real was adopted in 1994, as part of a thorough monetary reform to combat 
hyperinflation. 
Although exposed to the volatility of international commodities and capital 
markets, the Brazilian financial sector is still characterized by sound balance sheets, 
ample liquid assets and high balance and profitability (IMF). Capital markets in 
Brazil still have room for further development and it is largely constrained by the low 
duration and high interest rate of the environment (IMF) 
 The national financial sector is also quite supervised, being under the 
surveillance of three national policy boards and four supervisor entities. These 
institutions set policies, perform executive functions; regulate the currency, amongst 
other responsibilities. The country’s banking system is also highly developed, 
counting with public and private institutions, ample access to services and credit by 
the population and enterprises. The national development bank, BNDES aims to 
provide long-term financing to projects that will play a part in the country’s progress, 
especially in less-developed areas. (Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento, 2014) 
The bank’s operations may aim at solving socio-economic challenges, supporting 
exports, environmental projects and technologic innovation. BNDES is one of many 
Brazilian government agencies that focus on social developments. 
Historically, Brazil has had many fiscal challenges. This, added to steady but 
low growth rates and short-term investment constraints, places the country The 
country has never achieved Recently, due to the retraction and pessimist growth 
forecast of Brazilian’s GDP, Moody’s has downgraded the country’s credit rating to 
Baa2, the second lowest investment grade of the agency. One of the main concerns 
of the agency is that growth is unlikely to resume soon, as the country increases 
public debt and interest rates.. In the late years, a rising inflation and a poor public 
management of the GDP growth point towards a feeble economic period in the 
future. According to analyst Mauro Leos, the week growth rates could erode Brazil’s 
fiscal position and undermine its credit profile.3.2 The Oil Industry and it’s 
Participation in Brazil’s Economy. 
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3.2 The Oil Industry and it’s Participation in Brazil’s 
Economy 
According to the EIA, Brazil is the 8th largest consumer and 10th largest 
producer of energy in the world. When analyzing the oil scenario, it means that even 
though the country boast a very large production but also an internal consumption 
that results in less exports.  
As mentioned before, since 2008 Brazil has been the home to some of the 
biggest oil fields’ discoveries globally. This has drawn much attention to the country 
in the energy scenario.  
In 2014, Petrobras announced that the pre-salt basins’ exploration from the 
Santos and Campos was yielding 500,000 barrels per day. (Trefis Team, 2014) This 
news marked a milestone for the company, as the pre-salt discoveries in 2006 were 
greeted with optimism and doubt, due to the difficulty of exploring in deep waters. In 
approximately eight years, the Brazilian oil giant managed to overcome challenges 
in rapid timing. 
 
Image 7: Brazil’s Oil Production and Consumption (Energy Information 
Administration, 2013) 
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Furthermore, the exploration of these newly discovered oil fields has proven 
to be very expensive. In 2013, the deep-water field drilling was below expected by 
the offshore services industry. According to oil giant Petrobras, pre-salt has proven 
commerciality. If taken into account the accumulated production throughout the 
years, the pre-salt province now exceeds 360 million barrels of oil. From 2010 to 
2014, the average daily production from reservoirs has grown tenfold, going from an 
average of 42 thousand barrels per day in 2010 to 411 000 barrels per day in 2014 
(in May). This amount only represents about 20% of Brazilian total oil production, 
but Petrobras expects that, by 2018, the contribution of the exploration of pre-salt 
fields will amount to more than 50% of total oil extraction in Brazil (Petrobras, 2014) 
Industry growth is expected to increase in the following years, led by the 
natural resources and extraction sectors. This growth should be mostly propelled by 
the pre-salt discoveries. According to Petrobras, oil and gas production should 
double until the year 2020. (Planos de Negócios e Gestão 2013-2017) The gas 
distribution sector is expected to undergo significant growth, perhaps overcoming 
other energetic sectors. Infrastructure investments in gas ducts pipelines for gas 
transportation and distribution are scheduled, especially in the pre-salt areas. 
(Empresa de Pesquisa Energética, 2014) 
The biggest risks related to such projects are the inability to source enough 
capital to finance the higher levels of production and an inefficient project 
management. The Brazilian supply chain is known to be slow and there is a 
shortage of highly capacitated professionals in a management level. These are only 
some of the challenges currently experienced by foreign offshore companies doing 
business in the country. 
3.3 Government Role and Policies (Law and Regulations) 
3.3.1 Brazilian Legal System Overview 
 The Brazilian legal system is based on Portuguese Civil Law tradition. The 
Federal Constitution, in force since 5 October 1988, organizes the country as a 
Federative Republic, formed by the union of the states and municipalities and of the 
Federal District (CESA, Centro de Estudos das Sociedades de Advogados, 2012). 
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 Each state has their own court of appeal (every jury has their own way of 
judging); hence decisions vary from state to state. Decisions in the south part of the 
country may drastically vary to those in the Northern of Brazil. This is because most 
of the offshore industry is located in the south.  
3.3.2 Taxation 
 The Brazilian Tax System is very complex and it is not consolidated into a 
single tax code, thereby making it difficult for foreign companies to navigate 
between the many different rule sets. Depending on the specific import product, the 
import transaction can be subjected to several different taxes. According to the 
report "Doing Business in Brazil" by the Scottish Enterprise, the Brazilian taxation 
system comprises more than 3,200 rules relating to more than 57 different taxes, 
hence the type of taxes described in the following pages are only the most crucial 
for foreign companies to consider but to not represent a list of the totality of existent 
taxes. 
Federal Taxes:  
 Import duty (Imposto de Importação - II): The Import Tax is levied on 
imports of goods into the Brazilian territory. Its rates vary according to the nature of 
the goods and their classification under the Mercosur Common Nomenclature 
(NMC), but it usually ranges from 0% to 35% (CESA, Centro de Estudos das 
Sociedades de Advogados, 2012). The Import Tax is not a recoverable tax; 
therefore it is a cost for the foreign company.  
 Federal VAT (Imposto sobre Produtos Industrializados or IPI):  is levied 
through the first sale of imported goods on first sale of goods and on transactions 
involving manufactured goods. The Federal VAT rate varies depending on the 
traded product and ranges from 0% to 365%. IPI generally becomes a tax credit to 
offset IPI charged on subsequent transactions. The IPI is calculated on the CIF 
value and the added Import Duty (Scottish Enterprise, SDI and Subsea UK, 2012).  
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State Tax 
 ICMS (Imposto sobre Circulação de Mercadoria e Serviços ICMS): This 
value added tax is the main state-level tax and it is levied on operations involving 
circulation of goods. According to the legal guide for foreign investors in Brazil 
(2012), the goods include manufacturing, marketing, and imports and on interstate 
and inter-municipal transportation and communications services. It is non-
cumulative, and thus taxes due may be offset by credits arising from the purchase of 
raw materials, intermediary products, and packaging materials. The ICMS is not 
levied on exports 2. 
Municipal Taxes:  
 The Municipal tax on services (Imposto sobre serviços de qualquer 
natureza - ISS) is charged on certain services included in a Federal list of taxable 
services. Rates vary from 2% to 5%. Imported services are also subject to ISS 
taxation (Scottish Enterprise, SDI and Subsea UK, 2012). 
Contributions:  
 PIS-Import and COFINS: Import are levied on the importation of goods and 
services. Generally they are charged at a combined rate of 9.25%. The tax basis for 
PIS-Import and COFINS-Import on imported products is the customs value plus 
ICMS and PIS and COFINS itself, which leads to an effective tax rate of around 
13.45% (Scottish Enterprise, SDI and Subsea UK, 2012). 
 AFRMM: levied on all imports transported via maritime freight. The 
Supplemental Freight Charge for Renewal of the Merchant Marine (“AFRMM”) is 
levied on the freight charged by Brazilian and foreign navigation companies 
operating in Brazilian ports (Deloitte, 2010). This type of tax is calculated on freight 
price, using the application of the following rates: 
• 25%, regarding deep-sea navigation;  
                                                
2 Imports are generally subject to a 17% or 18% rate, while local transactions are subject to rates varying from 
7% to 18%. The ICMS is charged on the CIF value of the goods.  
 32 
• 10% on cabotage freight;  
• 40%, concerning lake and river navigation (only in the case of bulk cargo 
transported in the North and Northeast regions). 
For corporate and shareholder taxation please refer to APPENDIX A. 
3.3.3 Repetro 
 Tax Incentives for the Oil and Gas Sector (Regime Aduaneiro Especial de 
Exportação e Importação de Bens Destinados às Atividades de Pesquisa e de 
Lavra das Jazidas de Petróleo e de Gás Natural) - is a Brazilian special customs 
regime applicable to the importation and exportation of goods. This special regime is 
designed to prompt growth of the oil and gas industry in Brazil. The REPETRO is 
applicable to a determined set of products used in the production and extraction of 
oil and gas. In some cases ICMS may be charged at 3% of the CIF value on 
REPETRO goods but the importer can achieve the full suspension (0% ICMS) for 
specific equipment used for research and exploration of petroleum and natural gas 
(Offshore Center Denmark, 2009). 
 According to the law, REPETRO only applies to goods listed in Normative 
Instruction Nº. 844/08, May 9, 2008. REPETRO may also be applied to machinery 
and equipment parts, tools, appliances and other parts, as long as its use is directly 
related to the research and production of oil and natural gas (Regime REPETRO). 
In order to meet the conditions listed in the Normative Instruction, REPETRO regime 
allows the use of the following customs mechanisms:  
 Temporary Admission: REPETRO grants import duty, PIS, COFINS and IPI 
suspension of taxes on imports of machines, equipment and materials that are 
qualified for the REPETRO regime, owned by a foreign company and 
rented/leased/chartered to a Brazilian Company to be used in O&G, exploration or 
production activities. The taxes are suspended according to the term of the 
rental/leasing/charter agreement. 
 Deemed exportation without the necessity for the equipment to leave 
the country: If equipment is manufactured in Brazil to be used in O&G activities, it 
may be sold to a foreign company, formally exported (without leaving the country), 
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rented/leased to a Brazilian Company and reimported through temporary admission. 
Once the steps in the legislation are fulfilled, only ICMS will be levied on the 
transaction upon the temporary admission. In other words, REPETRO allows 
exporting of goods without the physical exit of Brazilian territory followed by a 
subsequent importation into Brazil through the temporary admission regime, which 
results in a decrease of the tax burden in comparison to an ordinary importation 
 Drawback Suspension: This mechanism is a special custom regime, which 
allows the importation of raw material that will be used in the industrialization 
process without levying import duty, PIS, COFINS and IPI through the use of the 
"drawback suspension".  
 At the end of the manufacturing process, the equipment must be sold to a 
foreign company, formally exported (without leaving the country), rented/leased to a 
Brazilian Company and reimported through temporary admission, otherwise, 
suspended taxes will be assessed (Amorin, 2014). In addition, it is important to 
acknowlegde that REPETRO is not applicable to the importation of goods originated 
from abroad under a leasing agreement with a foreign entity. 
Who Can Use REPETRO 
1. The holder of a license or authorization pursuant in accordance to Law No. 9478 
of August 6, 1997, to exercise in the country, within the activities referred to in 
Article 1. 
2. A company hired by the legal entity referred to in paragraph I for the provision of 
the services required to implement the activities that are the object of the 
concession or authorization, as well as their subcontractors. 
3. A locally-based company formally appointed by the legal entity that is item I, to 
promote the importation of goods that are subject to charter, lease, operating lease 
or loan, since it related to execution of contract for services concluded between 
them (Regime REPETRO). See APPENDIX B for the list of good subject to 
REPETRO law.   
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3.3.4 Local Content 
 As a member of the WTO, Brazil is prohibited from creating protectionist laws 
to protect the local market and forbidding the commercialization of imported 
products. Hence, Brazil has adopted indirect mechanisms to request for a minimum 
amount of local content from foreign companies, described as the following:  
• Subsidized financing through BNDES (Brazil Development Bank)  
• Tax breaks for companies that reach a certain level of local content  
• Quotas for preferential purchases of locally-manufactured goods in 
government tenders (Sperling, 2013) 
 In 1997, the Petroleum Law (Act 9478/97) regulated the participation of 
foreign companies in the exploration and production of oil. The Act established the 
regulatory regime for the industry, this new structure stated that even thought the 
rights remained in the property of the Union (Petrobras), it also concedes 
concession agreements to oil firms participating in the license rounds to explore 
geographic zones. 
 Since then ANP is the agency responsible for undertaking the oil exploration 
and extraction license rounds and supervising the execution on the concession 
agreements. A determinant factor for the participant company to win the concession 
is the level of commitment towards the local acquisition of goods and services, i.e. 
Local content offer.  
 Even though from round 1 to 4 (1999/2002) the local content offer was free, 
in round 5 the minimum levels of local content were established. In 2008 ANP 
stipulated the minimum and maximum levels of local content offers by foreign firms 
as well as a local content certification3. In addition, ANP issued the local content 
regulation known as "Local Content Primer" which basically contains formulas to 
                                                
3 The Local Content Primer also requires oil transferee companies in the oil and gas production to 
submit certificates from their local providers. In order for companies to obtain this certification, they 
must hire “certifying companies which are qualified and accredited by the ANP and whose criteria are 
previously defined by the Agency and aim to examine the compliance of sales to the required 
standard” (Source: www.anp.gov.br).  This certification adds a significant cost to the company's 
operation.  
  35 
measure the local content of goods, packages of good and services. If the firm does 
not comply with the standards of local content, they are most likely to face heavy 
fines.  
 Moreover, ANP has developed a formula for calculating local content index 
(índice de nacionalização). The formula is essentially the following: 
Value-based index (Iv):  
!"! = ! (1!− !!/!) !∗ !100!
!! = Value of imported components, including raw materials, including:  
1. CIF amount + customs duties of components incorporated to the equipment that 
were imported directly by manufacturer or by purchaser.  
2. Value of imported components acquired in the domestic market by the 
manufacturer, excluding IPI and ICMS.  
!! = Purchase price of the equipment, excluding IPI and ICMS.  
Weight-based index (Ip): 
!"! = ! (1!− !!"/!") !∗ !100!
!"! = Weight of imported components.  
!"! = Weight of complete equipment 
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4. Angola  
 In this section, an overview of the key aspects of the Angolan economic, 
financial, legal and political scenario will be presented. The focus will be centered on 
the oil and offshore industry, regarding legal particularities and participation of the 
sector in the Angolan economy. 
4.1 General Macroeconomic and Financial Scenario 
Angola is a nation with a peculiar macroeconomic and political context in the 
African continent. After 27 years of conflict, the country has been politically stable 
and in peace since 2002. 
From 2003 to 2008, Angola experienced an average of 17% of economic 
growth (African Development Bank, 2011), assuring that, by 2008, the country had 
lowered inflation from 70% to 13%, contained external debt, stabilized the currency, 
Kwanza (AOA) and built-up reserves (African Development Bank, 2011).  Oil taxes 
have ensured governmental revenues and fiscal surplus throughout the decade, as 
will be discussed further on.  
In 2013, the country’s Gross Domestic Product was US$ 121.7 billion (World 
Bank) in which the extractive industries, notably oil and mining, participate more 
significantly. The GDP of the country is divided within the following sectors: service 
(28.8%), agriculture (9.7%) and industry (61.5%). (KPMG, NKC, 2013) 
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Image 8: Angola’s GDP Growth (Ministério das Finanças Angola, 2014) 
During the last decade, Angola’s GDP growth has outperformed those of 
Africa and Austral Africa. After the steady two-digit growth the country experienced 
in the early 2000s, Angola has grown less, much due to the consequences 
economic crisis, but still maintaining positive outlooks. In 2013, the country’s GDP 
grew 5.1%, below the 7.1% expected for the country (Banco de Desenvolvimento de 
Angola, 2014). The under expected growth of the GDP was mostly due to the poor 
performance of the oil sector in 2013. It was mainly the performance of the energy, 
agriculture, fishing, manufacturing and construction industries that boosted the 
country’s growth in 2013.  
On the counter side, the country faces many challenges. State apparatus is 
still inept, with high levels of bureaucracy and corruption and an inefficient 
administration, as we will further discuss on the text. Similarly social indicators do 
not reflect the economic growth: 36% of Angolan citizens are below the poverty line 
and unemployment ranks 26%. (Muzima & Mazivila, 2014) The oil industry, despite 
being the largest of the country, only employs 1% of Angolan workers while the 
agriculture sector is responsible for nearly 70% of total employment (Muzima & 
Mazivila, 2014)4. Therefore, one can conclude that the political and macroeconomic 
                                                
4 The World Bank points to a lack of available data regarding specific percentages of labor force 
distribution. The institution claims that ”more than two-thirds of Angola’s labord force is employed in 
agriculture”. Authors Muzima and Mazivila specify the percentage at 70%. 
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stability allowed a speedy economic boom, fueled primarily by the growth of the oil 
industry, but did not create equality and welfare distribution.  
The same applies for infrastructural developmental. Even though much work 
is completed, infrastructure handicaps represent challenges to economic 
development. Infrastructure needed for basic social services, such as health and 
education, is yet lacking, making it even more difficult to overcome poverty 
challenges and social inequality. 
Important structural projects such as ports and the Benguela railway, which 
would connect the country’s coastal regions to Zambia, are currently under 
development.  The National Development Plan of Angola for the period of 2013-
2017 presents several projects, especially in the “priorities clusters” of Transports 
and Logistics, Housing and Energy and Water. Such ventures are a part of the 
“Angola 2025” strategic plan for development, which structures the country in 
different “development areas”. The main goal is to organize the country territorially, 
bringing basic services to remote areas but also providing the heavily industrial 
areas with better transport infrastructure, airports, ports, highways, cargo terminals, 
etc. (Ministério do Planeamento e do Desenvolvimento Territorial, 2012) The 
outlook is, thus, optimistic.  
The monetary policies of the country are a peculiar matter. Angola suffers 
from “Dutch disease”, commonly known as the “oil curse”. Due to the high level of 
natural resources exports (petroleum and diamonds), the Kwanza’s exchange rate 
has appreciated over the years. In the same scenario, most foreign investment 
allocation is made in the extractive sectors instead of non-natural resources 
commodities, also contributing to currency appreciation and lack of investment in 
non-natural resource related sectors. This leads to a decline in the cost of imported 
goods, atrophy of the growth of other industries in the country and consequential 
reduction in the competitiveness of domestic products and further dependence on 
imported consumer and strategic goods.  
While the oil industry imports most of its strategic goods, hindering local 
production from growing, the biggest disadvantage of a strong local currency is to 
local producers of the agricultural sector. A decline in the cost of imported food has 
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made domestic production less competitive and made the country too vulnerable to 
international price fluctuations. According to Africa Review, 90% of total food 
consumed in Angola is imported; and total imports in the first 9 months of 2013 in 
food and drinks represented $3.6 billion. (Maussion, 2014)  
Angola is also a country of extreme inequality, causing the Dutch disease to 
become an even bigger threat. Although Luanda is one of the most expensive cities 
of the world, two thirds of Angola’s population still lives on less than two dollars a 
day. Therefore, the poorest of Angola could suffer deeply from an international food 
price shock. Since March 2014 the Angolan government has set new import duties 
and levies in basic consumer goods, as means to stimulate local food production 
and protect the economy from price shocks and rising inflation, which has been 
steadily under control.  
The most relevant macroeconomic tendency for Angola is a governmental 
investment in strengthening its non-oil private economic sectors, making sure they 
will be more competitive, create more jobs, improve infrastructure and have an 
significant production output. (Plano Nacional de Desenvolvimento) 
 The financial sector of Angola was developed virtually from scratch in the last 
decade. In 2003, the total assets of the financial industry in Angola were US$ 3 
Billion. Eight years, in 2011, total assets amounted to US$ 57 billion, meanwhile the 
number of banks increased from 9 to 23 in the same period (World Bank, 2013). 
However, the high level of concentration of activities marks the growth of the 
financial sector. The five largest banks of the country represent 77% of the total 
actives (Muzima & Mazivila, 2014).  
The financial industry is also very inefficient. Information on credit, for 
example, is nearly inexistent, posing a great challenge to those doing business in 
the country. Furthermore, bank coverage is still quite poor in the country, and only 
22% of adults have access to bank services. (Muzima & Mazivila, 2014) 
“The system-wide lack of reliable financial information is due in 
part to the relative newness of the sector as a competitive, private-
sector-led industry and exacerbated by weaknesses in its key 
supportive institutions, both public and private.” (World Bank, 2013) 
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 This lack of information on credit and access to banking services creates an 
asymmetry in the country. Lenders give preference to firms that are bigger, older or 
foreign. Firms in Luanda are also given preference when compared to those outside 
of the capital. (World Bank, 2013) Therefore, this creates a very challenging 
scenario to business development, especially for locals. Again, this inefficiency 
creates a bottleneck in credit access for Angolan entrepreneurs and hinders local 
industrial growth. As a result, larger international firms dominate the market and 
there is a lack of medium businesses. Very small businesses do exist but cannot 
develop and are not competitive face to industry giants. 
However, the financials sector seems to be under key reforms. The country 
seeks to consolidate a stock exchange and capital market until 2016. (KPMG, NKC, 
2013) 
Sovereign risk rating agencies had consistently ranked Angola’s economy 
with positive outlooks, due to high growth rates and inflow of foreign direct 
investment in the extractive sectors. However, recently most agencies have revised 
their outlooks. 
Credit rating agency Fitch has recently revised the Angolan outlook from 
“positive” to “stable”. The main reason is the declining oil production, as targets 
were delayed mostly due to technical setbacks. (Reuters, 2014)Moody’s, on the 
other hand, upgraded Angola’s bond rating from Ba3, their lower score, to Ba2, 
based on “the strong medium-term economic outlook”; the agency’s “expectation 
that government credit metrics will continue to improve” and “demonstrated progress 
in implementing some structural reforms”, mostly by the government. (Moody's, 
2014) 
4.2 The Oil Industry and it’s Participation in Angola’s 
Economy 
Angola is Africa’s second largest oil producer (after Nigeria), and its 
economical and structural development is intertied with the oil industry as a whole. 
Angola’s first oil findings occurred in  
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The oil production has increased since post-wars years and peaked with pre-
salt drilling in 2012. The country’s production is expected to continue to rise and 
Angola may become Africa’s largest oil producer by 2018. The oil industry accounts 
for 60% of Angola’s fiscal revenues. The country’s main export is crude petroleum, 
representing a percentage of 98.1 of total exports in 2012 ( (Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology, 2014). This dependency highlights the country’s weakness to trade 
shocks. As seen in 2009, Angola is highly vulnerable to oil demand and price 
fluctuation. 
 
Image 9: Angola’s Oil Production by year (BP, 2014) 
From a fiscal perspective, governmental dependency on oil taxes is also 
alarmingly high. Efforts have been made since 2010 to lower such dependency, 
through an agenda that proposes non-oil sector growth. (African Development 
Bank) The strategy was put in action due to the 2009 world financial crisis, which 
resulted in an acute drop of oil demand that consequently resulted in a plunge on oil 
revenues and consequential fiscal crisis in the country. In the occasion, the 
International Monetary Fund signed a stand-by agreement with the government, in 
order to provide immediate liquidity. In 2010, a presidential decree structured the 
“Projecto Executivo da Reforma Tributária” – a Tax Reform Project. The main goals 
were to create economic diversification, by encouraging investors of varied sectors 
with tax incentives and simplified legislation. The government also proposed policies 
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to increase transparency and accountability of public financial management. 
(Fjelstad, Kirk Jensen, & Paulo, 2014) 
As mentioned before, the growth of non-oil related industries in Angola 
played an important part in assuring GDP growth, especially in 2013, when the 
petroleum sector underperformed. However, oil related taxes were still representing 
81% of governmental revenues in 2012.  (Muzima & Mazivila, 2014) Therefore, it is 
fair to state that, even though the reform has had some impact in diversification, it 
hasn’t completely been successful. 
The lack of a developing industry becomes clear when analyzing Angola’s oil 
production versus consumption. Historically, Angola’s petroleum consumption has 
always been very low. The country’s biggest source of energy is solid biomass, 
accounting for 59% of Angola’s energy consumption in 2011 (Energy Information 
Administration, 2013). Therefore, most of the country’s petroleum production is 
destined to exports, as stated before. 
 
Image 10: Angola’s Oil Production and Consumption (Energy Information 
Administration, 2013) 
Another characteristic of the Angolan economy, which may be part of the 
reasoning behind the little industrial diversification, is the lack of investment, in both 
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public and private spheres. The total investment rate, according to the World Bank 
(2012) is 13% of the GDP, contrasting with an average of 24% to the Sub-Saharan 
Africa region. It is difficult to pinpoint the exact representation of private investment, 
as data is quite limited, however, the World Bank (2012) suggests an equivalent of 
3% of the GDP. Therefore, 10% of the GDP sources back to public investment. 
From a fiscal perspective, it would be possible to increase such investment without 
harming public budget, mostly thanks to oil tax revenues. So, the Angolan 
government has been steadily increasing its participation in investment programs, 
focusing on priority objectives, such infrastructure projects. In order to increase 
private investments, tax and policies have been proposed by the government as to 
have a more investor-friendly legal environment. However, major law proposals and 
tax reforms are still pending approval by governmental institutions, such as the 
National Assembly. 
4.3 Government Role and Policies (Law and Regulations) 
4.3.1 Angolan Legal System Overview 
 The Angola legal system is based in the civil law. The country is divided in 
163 municipalities and 532 communes. The general legislation governing private 
investment in Angola was enacted by the Private Investment Act “Lei do 
Investimento Privado”, Act 20/11 of May 205. (Leitão, Teles, Soares da Silva & 
Associados, & Angola Legal Circle Advogados (ALC), 2012) 
 The Private Investment Act (LIP), part of the Private Investment Agency’s 
(Agência Nacional para o Investimento Privado/ANIP) foresees the existence of 
special legislation as regards investments to be made in certain areas, such as oil 
extraction6.   
                                                
5 This law repealed the Tax and Customs Incentives for Private Investment Act (“Lei sobre os Incentivos Fiscais 
e Aduaneiros ao Investimento Privado”, Act 17/03 of July 25.2003) and part of the Private Investment 
Framework Law (“Lei de Bases do Investimento Privado”, Act 17/03 of July 25.2003) 
6 Petroleum Act/“Lei das Actividades Petrolíferas”, approved by Act 10/04 of November 12.2004. 
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 Since the end of the civil war in 2002, the country has experienced a huge 
increase in foreign investment, due to the combination of political and economical 
stability as well as Angola’s potential in natural resources. The following chapter 
covers the issues related to the legal system for foreign investment and the special 
legislation applicable in the oil and gas industry in Angola. 
4.3.2 Investment Process 
 To start with, the Angolan Private Investment Agency (ANIP) works to 
promote private investment by Angolan and foreign nationals in targeted industry 
sectors and development zones. Hence companies seeking to invest in Angola must 
contact ANIP as a first step. 
 According to the legislation, the minimum amount for foreign investments is 
USD 1,000,000 in order to benefit from taxation incentives and repatriation of profits. 
For projects with investment values exceeding USD 10 million, the process for 
obtaining approval requires the commitment of an investment contract with the 
Angolan government, which is must be authorized by the Angolan Council of 
Ministers and ultimately approved by the President. Simultaneously, the firm must 
submit all the required documentation and follow the procedures which may require 
the intervention of several number of government agencies (Leitão, Teles, Soares 
da Silva & Associados, & Angola Legal Circle Advogados (ALC), 2012) 
 The rights for the oil fields in Angola are assigned to the National 
Concessionaire, Sociedade Nacional de Combustível de Angola, Empresa Pública, 
Sonangol, EP. In order to be granted access to petroleum operations, that is 
exploration, appraisal, development and production of crude oil and natural gas 
activities are regulated by Act 10/04 of November 12.20047. According to these 
laws, firms undertaking oil operations in Angola can only be performed under a 
license or oil concession issued by the Ministry of Petroleum. Please refer to 
APPENDIX C. 
                                                
7 Petroleum Act “Lei das Actividades Petrolíferas” and Decree 1/09 of January 27.2009 Petroleum Operations 
Regulation “Regulamento das Operações Petrolíferas”. 
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4.3.3 Special foreign-exchange legislation applicable to the oil 
industry 
 Act 2/2012, of January 13 (Foreign Exchange Act Applicable to Oil 
Industry/“Lei sobre o Regime Cambial Aplicável ao Sector Petrolífero”) establishes a 
special foreign-exchange regime for oil operations. In order to comply with this law, 
National Concessionaire and its associates (domestic or foreign corporate persons 
that are associated with the National Concessionaire through a commercial 
company, a consortium agreement or a production-sharing contract) are required to 
open a foreign currency account with banking institutions domiciled in Angola for 
payment of taxes and other fiscal obligations to the State, as well as for payment of 
goods and services provided by foreign residents and non-residents, and an 
account in national currency for payment of goods and services provided by resident 
entities. 
 However, this act also stipulates that once firms cover its fiscal obligations to 
the state, the firm will then be allowed to place the surplus by the foreign associates 
on the domestic or foreign market. In addition, the money that corresponds to the 
company's dividends, profits, depreciation of the investment and other capital 
remuneration, the firms are entitled to deposit them in foreign financial institutions  
4.3.4 Taxation 
 The economical fiscal system of Angola involves important regulatory 
aspects of oil industry tax enacted by specific legislation (Act 13/04 of December 24, 
or Taxation of Petroleum Activities Act/“Lei sobre a Tributação das Actividades 
Petrolíferas”) and establishes certain economic factors for the concessions, though 
these are usually set out in the agreements signed for the execution of petroleum 
operations. 
 The special taxation mechanism applies to all entities resident or non-
resident, provided they are engaged in research, development, production, storage, 
sale, export, processing and transportation of crude oil and natural gas. This regime 
also exempts from any kind of taxation the share of capital of companies engaged in 
petroleum activities. 
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The special taxation of petroleum activities mechanism includes the following 
five taxes: 
(1) Petroleum Production Tax  
(2) Petroleum Income Tax; 
(3) Petroleum Transaction Tax  
(4) Surface Charge; 
(5) Training Levy 
 A general principle applicable for the fist three taxes, stipulates that the 
calculation of the taxable income is done independently and separately for each 
concession or development area, hence the tax unit used is the concession or 
development area. Therefore, all domestic and foreign firms that are engaged in 
petroleum operations in Angola are subject to this special tax mechanism, and the 
calculation of the taxable income is separated for each oil concession.  
Petroleum Income Tax 
 The Petroleum Income Tax is levied on net income resulting from sales made 
at the end of each month, earned in the pursuit of exploration, development, 
production, storage, sale, export, processing and transportation of oil, in the pursuit 
of wholesale trade of products resulting from these activities and also in activities 
incidental or ancillary to those activities. The applicable tax rate may vary between 
50% and 65.75%, depending on whether the income is obtained through a 
production-sharing agreement or not (Ministério dos Petróleos Angola).   
Petroleum Production Tax 
 The Petroleum Production Tax is levied on the amount of crude oil and 
natural gas measured at the wellhead, excluding the quantities that are consumed 
during the petroleum operations (Previously agreed and assent by the National 
Concessionaire). This type of tax is not applied to entities associated to production-
sharing agreements. (Leitão, Teles, Soares da Silva & Associados, & Angola Legal 
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Circle Advogados (ALC), 2012) 
The tax rate is 20% though it may be reduced to 10% in the following 
situations: 
1. Oil operations in marginal fields 
2. Oil operations in maritime areas with water depths greater than 750 meters 
3. Oil exploration in hard-to-access onshore areas previously defined by the 
Government  
Petroleum Transaction Tax 
 The Petroleum Transaction Tax is levied on taxable income determined in 
the same way as the Petroleum Income Tax. However, as the previous form of tax, 
this it is not applied to entities associated to production-sharing agreements. The tax 
rate is 70%. (Leitão, Teles, Soares da Silva & Associados, & Angola Legal Circle 
Advogados (ALC), 2012) 
4.3.5 Surface Charge 
 This tax is levied on the area of the concession or on the development areas. 
This fee is charged at a fixed rate of USD 300 per square kilometer licensed for oil 
activity. (Leitão, Teles, Soares da Silva & Associados, & Angola Legal Circle 
Advogados (ALC), 2012) 
4.3.6 Contribution to Angolan Staff Training (Training Levy) 
 Foreign or domestic firms associated to the National Concessionaire are 
required to pay a contribution to the Angolan Staff Training. The contribution fee 
may be paid as a yearly installment of USD 200,000 or USD 0.15 per barrel or 0.5% 
of annual gross income, depending on whether the firm is performing exploration 
and production activities or whether is a subcontractor. (Leitão, Teles, Soares da 
Silva & Associados, & Angola Legal Circle Advogados (ALC), 2012) 
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4.3.7 Local content 
 In accordance to the Petroleum act, foreign firms who are under a 
concession or prospecting license, as well as firms that work in any part of the value 
chain in the oil business, must acquire Angolan materials and equipment if the 
inputs required are identically found to those available in the international market. 
The law only applies if their prices do not exceed more than 10% to the prices in the 
international market. This percentage includes customs and taxes, shipping and 
insurance cost.  
 In addition, firms are required to guarantee sufficient capital to fulfill the 
obligations assumed. Thus, in the case of firms holding a prospective license, the 
amount of the guarantee must be 50% of the value of the job agreed. For those 
firms associated to the National Concessionaire, the value of the guarantee is the 
value agreed to perform the mandatory work schedule complied in the oil 
concession contract. In some cases, Sonangol may also require that the firm 
declare a parent company as a guarantee. 
4.3.8 Special legislation on hiring foreigners for the oil industry 
 The so-called "Angolanisation" is a policy introduced by the Angolan 
government with the main objective to foster the hiring of Angola nationals and 
balance the asymmetry resulted from expatriate workers in Angola territory. The 
decree 5/95 of April 7 determines the need for 70% of the workers of Angolan 
companies to be Angolan nationals. 
 The executive decree 45/10 of May 10 established specific regulations 
regarding the hiring of staff, including a new system of recruitment, training and 
development of Angolan personnel and the hiring of foreign personnel to conduct 
petroleum operations in the country. 
 Additionally, the decree-Law 17/09 of June 26 enacts that hiring of 
expatriates by companies operating in the oil industry shall have due regard for and 
preference of hiring Angolans, regardless of the professional category or nature the 
post to be occupied, and (ii) give equal treatment to foreign workers and Angolans 
who have the same job and perform the same duties, particularly with regard to 
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remuneration and benefits, thereby prohibiting any kind of discrimination. 
(REPÚBLICA DE ANGOLA: MINISTÉRIO DO INTERIOR: Serviço de Migração e 
Estrangeiros, 2009) 
Therefore, companies aiming at hiring expatriates for their operations in 
Angola must first obtain confirmation that there are no Angolan personnel qualified 
to perform the work. Moreover, in order to obtain permission of the Ministry of 
Petroleum, firms are required to demonstrate that the labor market has no Angolan 
citizens available for the job requested.  
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5. Risk Assessment Analysis 
5.1 Introduction 
 The following section presents the risk assessment analysis for the most 
important aspects firms need to consider when establishing a subsidiary in Brazil 
and Angola. As previously stated, the framework will assess several decision 
problems, ranking them according to the table previously presented. 
Decision Problem  Expected Loss/Gain External Assistance 
Standard Low Not needed 
Advanced Significant Needed 
Complex Large Detailed Analysis required 
 
Table 3: Decision Problem Categorization (Aven & Vinnem, Risk 
Management with Applications from the Offshore Petroleum Industry, 2007) 
 In this methodology, the decision problems to be taken into account are 
specific for the offshore industry and the developing markets of Brazil and Angola. 
Such decision problems are the key aspects to assess when planning to 
internationalize to one of these markets. The authors have analyzed each decision 
problem and will present the assessment, together with a brief overlook of the 
reasoning behind such categorization. 
Finally, the methodology will also include an assessment of the risk related to 
each decision problem and how manageable is such risk. A high risk is a risk that is 
associated to very large losses or gains for a company; a medium risk would be 
attached to the possibility of significant losses or gains for a company. Finally, a low 
risk would incur in low losses and low gains.  
The manageability of the risk is related to how risks could be handled. In other 
words, to which degree companies or professionals would be able to act upon the 
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risk, taking strategic decisions in order to ensure that there will be no major losses. 
By managing a risk correctly, a company will be able to see higher returns. (Aven & 
Vinnem, Risk Management with Applications from the Offshore Petroleum Industry, 
2007) However, some scenarios inherently have low manageability of risk, as the 
mitigation of risk will not be linked to actions that company can take. For example, in 
a country where there is no strong government or a government unwilling to 
cooperate and little transparency, a company cannot manage a risk of political 
instability and losses due to this matter, as there are no actions to be taken with the 
appropriate stakeholders, even if assistance is hired. A similar case was seen in 
Bolivia, for example, when Evo Morales rendered oil and gas exploration state-
owned, forcing companies out of the country. A high risk with low manageability 
should be generally avoided, as it could result in great losses. A high risk with high 
manageability, on the other hand, if well managed, can result in great gains. 
Decision Problem 
 
 Risk Manageability 
High High 
Medium Medium 
Low Low 
Table 4: Risk and Manageability. Adapted from (Aven & Vinnem, Risk 
Management with Applications from the Offshore Petroleum Industry, 2007) 
It is important to note that in some decisions problems, the factor “need of 
external assistance” is not taken into account, as hiring a detailed analysis or 
outside consultancy will not affect the outcomes. Such decision problems are, 
namely: political stability, piracy, currency exchange and oil production. 
The choice of each decision problems and their categorization is a result of 
the extensive research performed by the authors and the interviews the authors 
carried out to the representative of Maersk Drilling and Sigbjørn Stangeland, project 
manager for DOF Subsea as well as the interviews conducted by external 
organizations to Niels Husted, founder and CEO of Rocktec, Knud Bach, CEO of 
Aalborg Industries South America and the representatives of Hydrasun, Nautronix, 
Viper Subsea and Paulo Jorge Veiga and Rui Paulo Ferreira - General Manager 
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Business Relations Manager from the Offshore Center Angola.  
 In addition the authors used, as a basis to compose the list, the information 
provided during the seminar held on February 13.2014 "Opportunities and 
challenges on the Brazilian shipping and offshore industry" performed by Oddbjørn 
Slinning - representative of Wikborg Rein, Bernando Mendes Vianna -Head of the 
Maritime and Shipping Vieira Rezende, Joyce Jacobsen - Senior Associate, 
Shipping and Offshore Group Viera Rezende/Wikborg Rein and Dag Schjerven - 
President and CEO Wilhelmsen Maritime Services. 
 The authors also had access to company presentations from several 
Maritime and Offshore Businesses, such as DOF and Subsea 7 throughout the 
years of 2013 and 2014, as a part of extracurricular activities during the Master 
program at the Norwegian School of Economics. Furthermore, the authors 
interviewed Academic experts in the fields of Angola and Brazil, highlighting the 
contribution of professor Jonuel Gonçalves, a Brazilian Economist who has 
published several books about Angola. 
 The extensive literature review, paired with the insights from corporate and 
academic experts gave the authors the base for developing the framework and 
properly identifying the decisions problems and their characterization.  
 The decision problems are as follows: ! Project Schedule (Project Management Value Chain) ! Investment: FDI entry modes ! Corruption and Transparency ! Bureaucracy ! Legal System Challenges ! Tax Complexities ! Financial Sector (Banking System) ! Credit Ratings ! Infrastructure ! Local Content and Labor ! Trade ! Political Stability 
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! Piracy ! Currency exchange ! Oil Production 
 
The next sub-section will present each decision problem individually and assess 
them while taking into account the uncertainty, risk and manageability criteria.  
5.2 Decision Problems  
Project Schedule (Project Management Value Chain) 
The project management when moving into an emerging market should take 
into account possible timeline delays.  
Based on most interviews and reports from foreign professionals who have 
done business in Brazil, project management is one of the cultural challenges 
foreign companies face. Timelines are set but usually not carried out, as the pace of 
business is Brazil is much slower than expected and delays are quite frequently. For 
example, the taxes and bureaucracy related to importing goods usually make the 
timeframe for any project much longer. A professional from Nautronix stated: 
 “In reality everything takes much, much longer than you anticipate. 
You need to take a long-term approach and be prepared to invest significant 
time and resources in your efforts.” 
To the previous statement he added: “(...) timescales given were 
optimistic”. Therefore, it is important to take into account, when moving to 
Brazil, that most actions will move slower than expected, probably delaying 
the project management timeframes organized previously. Another feedback 
from a Hydrasun professional pointed to an also slow supply chain, delayed 
by legislations and a still unfamiliar local scenario with the demands of more 
developed markets. 
“(...) is the supply chain in Brazil. It is slow, much more reactive rather 
than pro-active and cumbersome. The complex export import legislation in 
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Brazil does not help this but neither does the more seemingly short-term and 
unplanned approach by those in the supply chain. For example, we have had 
to work hard with our suppliers to increase their stock as they are not used to 
large orders, preferring or more accustomed to pre-ordering smaller 
quantities rather than thinking ahead and planning bigger orders.”  
As a general conclusion, it is easy to state that the timeframes planned when 
establishing new businesses in Brazil should take into account delays, either due to 
bureaucratically, tax related or supply chain setbacks. Project management may 
even face infrastructure setbacks as Brazilian ports currently face bottlenecks. 
Realistically, the scenario will not change in the upcoming years and the most 
straightforward way to prepare is to have enough extra assets to be able to circle 
through any eventual setbacks and prepare timelines with enough extra time to 
assure that projects will still be met. 
 Even though there are possible losses from the low speed supply chain and 
project management in Brazil, these issues are easily surmounted by forehead 
planning and realistic time frames, including spare time to follow the slower pace of 
Brazilian business culture. 
 On the other hand, Angola has a much speedier project management 
timeline. The Angolan oil business sector is very adapted to foreign companies and 
the oil and gas is the country’s main industry. According to interviews from the 
professional from Maersk Drilling, the focus should be to meet governmental 
requirements and support a case that the company is interested in investing in the 
growth of Angola when entering the country.  
 For the classification of the project schedule decision problems, the authors 
scored Brazil under the “Complex” category. The main reasoning behind such 
classification is the existence of possible large losses when not taking into account 
the local characteristics of project management. In order to fully prepare for possible 
setbacks, cultural shocks and other unpredicted situations, it is important to count 
with local external consultancy. Angola falls into the “Advanced” category, as it 
would still require external consultancy. However, the country’s focus in the oil 
industry speeds up the project management for the offshore sector.  
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Overall, the risk posed by poor management of the project schedule may be 
very high, but it is also highly manageable if the company takes into account the 
characteristics of each country’s supply and value chains and prepare accordingly. 
For Brazil, the risk of project management is higher than that of Angola, which 
scores a medium risk. However, in both countries the manageability of the risk is 
high, as it possible for companies to adapt to local value chains. 
Investment: FDI entry modes 
 In order for the firm to determine a foreign location, they first must learn what 
entry models are allowed in a specific industry or region or for specific ownership 
sharing and if there is any specific local requirement. FDI entry modes involve the 
ownership of property, assets, projects and businesses invested in the host country. 
Hence, the following modes require a higher commitment than the one required by 
international trade or transfer related modes but also involve a higher risk and long-
term goals. FDI main entry modes include branch office, joint venture, and wholly 
owned subsidiary.8 
 In the case of Brazil suppliers must be legally established or represented to 
qualify as government contracts, thus foreign firms without operations in Brazil may 
only participate in international tenders calls. A firm may also be represented 
through a joint venture with a Brazilian firm, however at least 51% must be Brazilian 
capital participation and the operational control must be done by Brazilian nationals 
(Swiss Business Hub Brazil, 2010). As stated by Petrobras, ‘Brazilian companies’ 
means companies that have manufacturing processes and after-sales services in 
                                                
8 Definitions of entry modes by Menipaz et al, 2011: i) Branch Office is a foreign 
entity in a host country in which is not incorporated but exist as an extension of the 
parent company and it is legally registered as a branch. ii) Join venture is a 
collaborative whereby profits and other responsibilities are assigned to each party 
according to the contract. Each party cooperates as a separate legal entity and 
bears its own liabilities. iii). A wholly own subsidiary is an entry mode in which the 
investing firm owns 100 percent of the new entity in the host country. (Menipaz & al, 
2011) 
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Brazil, thus creating jobs and collecting taxes in the country.  
 In the case of Angola, the Petroleum Act establishes that firms undertaking 
oil operations in Angola can only be performed under a license or oil concession 
issued by the Ministry of Petroleum. However the legislation does not obligate firms 
to have a previous set up branch or joint venture with an Angolan company. 
Nevertheless, firms must have a minimum amount of USD 1,000,000 as a 
prerequisite of investment.  
 In addition, while Petrobras has a "closed" procurement system, whereby it 
can choose and invite three companies to participate in tender (Note: It is 
mandatory for firms interested in becoming suppliers to register in the Cadastro 
Corporativo. This registry certifies that the company has been approved by 
Petrobras’ legal, technical, financial and tax qualification requirements) while for 
Sonangol, firms interested in the oil concession may associate to the National 
Concessionaire either through consortium agreements or incorporation of the firm to 
Sonangol.  
 Therefore the authors observe that due to higher complexity of setting up a 
branch or joint venture involve higher risk, Brazil comprises a larger risk than Angola 
with regards to the entry mode established by the countries legislation, yet both 
countries rank as "Advance" due to the procedures firms have to go through in order 
to establish a subsidiary in either of the two countries. This risk is also characterized 
by high manageability, since both nations provide different tools and mechanism to 
undertake FDI to prospective firms.  
Corruption and Transparency 
 The CPI scores and ranks countries/territories based on how corrupt a 
country’s public sector is perceived to be. It is a composite index, a combination of 
surveys and assessments of corruption, collected by a variety of reputable 
institutions. The CPI is the most widely used indicator of corruption worldwide.  
 The following table indicates Brazil and Angola's perceived level of public 
sector corruption on a scale of 0-100, where 0 means that a country is perceived as 
highly corrupt and a 100 means that a country is perceived as very clean. A 
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country's rank indicates its position relative worldwide9 (Source: 
http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2013/) 
Country(Risk( Regional(Risk( Country(
CPI(2013(
Score(
153 38 out of 48 Angola 23 
72 13 out of 32 Brazil 42 
Table 5: Corruption Index Brazil and Angola (Corruption Perception Index, 2013) 
 As illustrated in the table, Brazil is perceived to be less corrupted then 
Angola, and ranks higher in the CPI 2013 with a difference of 19 points to the 
African nation. Yet, both countries are taking measures to reduce the degree of 
corruption faced by the nations. On the Brazilian side, the country is a co-founder of 
the Open Government Partnership. The country’s leadership and participation 
illustrates that the government has strong aims to improve transparency and prevent 
corruption in the sector. In addition since 2010, the electronic platform Transparency 
Portal (Portal da Transparencia) enables Brazilians to track how public money is 
being used in all federal government programs.  
 On the other hand, the financial relationship between the government and 
Sonangol is complex and secretive, as are the sub-contracting procedures used to 
assign sector work to outside companies (BUSINESS ANTI-CORRUPTION 
PORTAL). Even though there are indications that some revenues continue to be 
used by the elite to enrich themselves and/or secure their hold on power (Marques 
de Morais, R, 2010), Sonangol has made progress in terms of organizational 
disclosure, in areas such as the publication of company accounts and external 
audits. In addition, according to the EITI (Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative) the country has made significant progress in bringing the country in line 
with EITI revenue transparency standards and now publishes monthly petroleum 
receipts on the Ministry of Finance’s website.  
                                                
9 The results are based in the Corruption Perception Index  which included in its study 177 countries. 
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 For these reasons, in terms of corruption the authors assigned an "advance" 
risk to Angola in comparison to the "standard" risk companies could experience in 
Brazil. Yet, this risk is to some extent manageable by firms, as they usually deal with 
high degrees of scrutiny by its home country/other nations where they operate. 
Hence, this risk it to a great extent highly manageable by firms for both of the 
countries.  
Bureaucracy 
 Companies operating in Brazil are face to deal with a large number of 
regulatory agencies, and in some cases this heavy bureaucracy may lead to 
increase the probabilities to demand for bribes by public officials. According to the 
enterprise survey 2009, 68.8 percent of Brazilian business owners and top 
managers identified corruption as a major constraint in the sector.  
 The federal system of Brazil provides its politicians considerable unrestricted 
power in regards to the use of public funds. The lack of a larger control over public 
funds makes local governments prone to corruption, as explained before, the laws, 
procedures and its enforcement capacity may vary among states.  
 In addition, customs procedures for imports, environmental licenses and 
allocation of contracts are expensive and time consuming, resulting in delays for 
companies to set up their business in the country. According to the World Bank 
Enterprise Survey 2009, 48.4 percent of firms identified business licensing and 
permits as a major constraint, while for Latin America the rate is 18.4% and for the 
world 12.9%.  
 In the case of Angola, the situation is not much different as the World 
Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011 confirms that 
corruption and inefficient government bureaucracy are among the greatest 
constraints for business operations in the country. According the World Bank 
Enterprise Survey 2010, 75.6 percent of firms identified corruption as a major 
constraint while 48.9 percent of the companies surveyed expected to make informal 
payment to “get things done", while for Sub-Saharan Africa this number reduces to 
27.8 percent.  
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 According to the interviewee representing Viper Subsea in Brazil  "The 
bureaucracy involved in securing permits and permissions is excruciatingly 
complicated and it is best to get the right advice from the outset on the process and 
be patient" . Thus Brazil is categorized as "complex" risk with medium 
manageability, as despite the possibility of hiring an expert, companies must follow 
the numerous procedures and paper work required by the country. 
 As per Angola, the authors have also assigned a "complex" risk, as even 
though in recent years the country has improved the overall regulatory environment 
the business environment remains difficult. It is plagued by pervasive corruption, 
complex bureaucratic procedures and an underdeveloped financial system (US 
Department of State, 2010). Additionally, the risk is ranked with medium 
manageability for the same reasons described for Brazil.  
Legal System Challenges 
 According to Bernando Mendes Vianna - Head of the Maritime and Shipping 
- casualty and emergency response at Vieira Rezende- dealing with the Brazilian 
legal system is not an easy task as the country's slowness in its legislation causes 
complex or controversial subjects to take years to be regulated.  
 Moreover, the multiplicity of laws leads to a single subject may be regulated 
in several statuses, or there might be inconsistence as laws and regulations from 
different levels may have a conflict in its content. 
 Another major constraint for companies is the overburden of courts as each 
state has their own court of appeal (Every jury has their own way of judging); hence 
decisions vary from state to state. I.e.: Decisions in the south part of the country are 
very different to those in the Northern of Brazil. The reason is that most of the 
offshore industry is located in the south of Brazil. Furthermore, as the legislation 
divides the country between Federal Union, States and Municipalities, it forces 
companies to deal with authorities from the three levels of the government, thus 
proceedings may take a long time until a final conclusion is reached. 
 Another important limitation is the confusing tender protocols for Petrobras in 
certain subjects, as there is no specific deadline for Petrobras to start administrative 
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processes and its contract structure presents vague language and unclear 
conditions. For this reason, due to all the constraints of the composition of the legal 
system in Brazil, the risk is ranked as "complex" with a medium manageability, as 
despite the fact that companies may use legal advice to overcome this burden, the 
legislation needs to be followed by the firm.  
 The legal system in Angola is weak and fragmented and based on the 
Portuguese and Customary Law system. In 2011 the private investment law was 
updated mandating that all payments made from the petroleum sector must go 
through Angola if the recipient is considered to be a resident entity. However the 
implementation of these new laws have created some degree of uncertainty the 
Angolan banking sector and for foreign investors. This new Private Investment Law 
is more restrictive than the previous law as forces foreign companies to only use 
Angolan banks and to pay subcontractors through those bank accounts irrespective 
of where the subcontractors are based (New Investment Frontiers: Angola and 
Mozambique, 2013).  
 The authors have ranked this decision problem as "standard" risk with 
medium manageability, as despite that Angola's legal system is somewhat 
"primitive", the laws and procedures to invest in the country can be interpreted 
without any legal assistance. Yet, the banking sector still needs to go through an 
overhaul in order to satisfy the laws imposed by the country while providing an 
accurate service to foreign firms, a topic described later in the document.  
Tax Complexities 
 According to the report "Doing Business in Brazil 2012" Foreign companies 
face many difficulties while navigating among the 3200 rules and more than 57 
different taxes as the Brazilian tax system is very complex and is not stipulated into 
a single tax code.   It is critical for companies looking to establish operations in 
Brazil to invest in tax and legal advisory since when submitting a bid or commercial 
proposal, federal, state and municipal taxes need to be considered (Scottish 
Enterprise, SDI and Subsea UK, 2012). 
 Additionally, some of the existent tax issues in Brazil include incorrect 
calculation and payment of taxes inducing to less profit or even losses, tax 
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assessments by the government may result in fines up to 150 percent plus interest 
and mistakes in the classification of goods. According to the World Development 
Indicators for tax policies for 2013, the number of hours spent to prepare, file and 
pay taxes is 2600, the highest number worldwide. These facts ratify the authors’ 
verdict to rank tax procedures in Brazil as "Complex", having high risk with medium 
manageability; the last one due to all the time and expertise required to fulfill the 
taxation laws. 
 On the contrary, in the case of Angola, in 2010, 26.4 percent of firms 
identifying tax rates as a major constraint in comparison to 34.4 percent average for 
the Sub-Saharan region (World Bank Enterprise Survey, 2010). Yet, PwC’s Paying 
Taxes 2013 report, Angola ranks 154th out of 185 countries. According to the study, 
companies spend in average 282 hours on tax matters with 31 as the total number 
of tax payments 31, reflecting a lack of electronic filing and payment across each of 
the major taxes. 
 However, the government published in 2012 a number of measures aimed at 
diversifying the economy while increasing the tax revenues. These measures10 
intend to make the Angolan tax framework more simple and fair for foreign 
companies. Thus, Angola scores high risk and the manageability as high.  
Legal content and Labor 
 The government of Brazil started imposing local content requirements on 
foreign companies since 1999 in order to stimulate oil companies to purchase goods 
and services domestically. However since the discoveries of pre-salt offshore oil in 
2007, the government increased the percentage of local content and the pressure 
on the local oil service industry (from 57% in 2003 to nearly 70% in 2010). 
 A major constraint companies have reported in regards with the local content 
obligations is that, under the concession system, the percentages of local content 
are used as judgment criteria at the bid rounds promoted by ANP for the award of 
onshore and offshore blocks (Valois and Pedrete, 2014).  
                                                
10 Included under the section of taxation for the Angola Legal Framework 
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 For Angola the situation is not that different, as the Angolan government 
requires that foreign companies prioritize local labor at a rate of 30% foreign 
employees and 70% Angolan employees, this is named by the government as the 
Angolanisation plan. Due to the challenging competency levels of local citizens and 
the huge deficit of skilled technical and professional personnel, companies are faced 
with extra cost in training programs. In addition, retaining staff in Angola is also quite 
a challenge as the market is extremely competitive for reliable skilled labor, however 
those companies paying higher salaries and offering better working conditions are 
more likely to succeed. 
 Coupled with the new requirement for foreign investors to increase the level 
of training and involvement in local infrastructure development, many companies 
who are forced to recruit expatriate staff with skills to match their needs, face 
troubles for visa applications. Furthermore, in the legislation on employment of 
expatriates, foreign workers are not protected under the labor law, holding only 
national employment protection policies.  
 In any case, one of the biggest challenges for both countries is the lack of 
human resources. This qualifies both countries risk as "complex" as the majority of 
companies are forced to invest in the training of local staffing and relying in 
expatriate labor is not viable in the long term. Yet, the manageability is medium for 
both countries, as in spite of the tight market for skilled labor, companies such as 
Maersk Drilling have overcome this challenge by developing an "Angolanisation 3-
year plan" focused on training, educating and employing local talent; an example 
other companies may follow, creating not only skilled labor, but also long-term 
relations within the communities they operate.  
Political Stability 
 The Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI) analyzes and 
evaluates the quality of democracy, a market economy and political management in 
129 developing and transition countries. It measures successes and setbacks on 
the path toward a democracy based on the rule of law and a socially responsible 
market economy. 
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Country 
Ranking 
Status Index 
(Among 129 
countries) 
 Status 
Index 
 
Democracy 
Status 
  Political 
Participation 
Stability of 
Democratic 
Institutions 
  Political 
and Social 
Integration 
Angola 97 4,44 4,55 4,0 3,0 5,0 
Brazil 17 8,02 8,15 9,0 8,5 7,3 
Table 6: Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Indexes (BTI) - one (the 
lowest value) to 10 (highest value) (Transformation Index BTI , 2014) 
  The table above shows the different aspects that comprise the political 
situation for Angola and Brazil. As observed in the graph, Brazil ranks pretty high in 
comparison to the African nation. According to these numbers, Brazil holds a better 
quality of democracy, hence the risk of foreign companies operating in this market 
are lower to those faced in Angola, giving a score of an "Standard" risk to Brazil, 
with low risk. 
 On the contrary, one of the main reasons for Angola to rank with a poor 
quality of democracy is due to the nation's recent civil war ending in 2002 as even 
though the country has managed to maintain political stability since then and 
adopted a new constitution in 2010, the African nation still faces major challenges in 
creating a greater political participation and transparency in its democratic 
institutions. Consequently, the authors have assigned a high risk, ranking as an 
“Advanced” decision problem. 
 In terms of manageability, political stability is an exogenous factor that is 
unlikely to be controlled by the foreign firms operating in the country. For this 
reason, the manageability is low for both nations.   
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Financial Sector 
 
Image 11: Brazil’s ease of getting credit ranking when compared to other 
countries in the same region (World Bank, 2014) 
The Brazilian financial sector is highly developed, as presented before in this 
work. One important factor to take under account are high interest rates in the 
banking system and an underdeveloped spot market for offshore and subsea. 
According to the World Bank (2014), Brazil isn’t an interesting scenario for lenders 
and borrowers when compared to its neighbors. The country lacks strength in legal 
rights enforcements when assuring rights for credit transactions. However, the 
transparency and accessibility of information regarding credit is widely available and 
the country scores next to the maximum in the Doing Business 2015 index, as 
shown below. 
  65 
 
Image 12: Brazil’s scores on credit policies and access to information (World 
Bank, 2014) 
 
Image 13: Angola’s Getting Credit Ranking. (World Bank, 2014) 
The Angolan financial sector, on the other hand, is very under developed and 
getting access to credit may be quite complicated. The country still lacks a formal 
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support and unified legal framework for secured transactions. There is no existing 
modern collateral registry in an electronic database or guaranteed reimbursement 
for creditors when a business is liquidated. However, the Angolan law does stipulate 
that part of the transactions from offshore companies have to go through Angolan 
banks, increasing the risk for foreign businesses. 
 
Image 14: Angola’s scores on credit policies and access to information 
(World Bank, 2014) 
 To sum up, the Angolan financial scenario is still considered very incipient. 
The risk, therefore, becomes quite high when depending on local systems for 
transactions. Due to the country’s civil war, the financial system is yet to develop 
and become competitive, even when compared to those of other emerging markets.  
 For the financial sector decision problem, the authors ranked Angola as 
“Advanced”. The lack of a developed infrastructure incurs in a need of external 
assistance in order to better position in the Angolan financial sector and banking 
system. Not seeking for consultancy could potentially result in major losses. Brazil, 
however, would be qualified as “Standard”, as the country has a developed banking 
and financial sector. Furthermore, information is easily available and transparent, so 
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there would be no need to hire external consultancy, provided there are company 
employees who master the Portuguese language. 
 In Brazil, as the country already has a well-established financial sector, the 
risk is low and highly manageable. However, in Angola, the lack of transparency and 
the unease of access to financial and banking system increase the risk to medium 
and the manageability to low. 
Credit ratings 
 The credit ratings of both countries for the current year can be found in 
APPENDIX D. The reason the authors chose to include such information when 
taking risk assessment evaluations is for companies to be aware of the perspective 
in each country’s financial scenario. Agencies’ ratings fluctuate and may indicate 
downturns for upcoming years. Therefore, considering abrupt downgrading, it may 
be wise to expect a possible macroeconomic downturn in the country and make it 
harder to obtain investments.  
 For the purposes of the risk assessment, credit ratings are “Standard” for 
both countries, as there is no external help needed to analyze such information and 
it is a highly manageable risk, posing little or no loss if correctly interpreted and the 
interpretation of such ratings is widely available. 
Both countries also score low in the credit ratings risk, as this criterion 
represents more a guideline than an actual risk. Finally, the manageability is also 
high, as companies can control their finances, preparing for pessimistic scenario 
and also can avoid internationalization in period of high financial instability. In such 
periods, the credit rating could act as interesting guidelines for benchmarking 
between the countries, as stated before.  
Infrastructure 
 Brazil is a country of multi-faceted trade portfolio and diversified industry. 
Therefore, the oil industry in itself, although highly important, does share its status 
with other sectors. The Brazilian ports are usually busy and face many bottlenecks. 
As mentioned before, the slow project timelines and high levels of bureaucracy 
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slows construction and infrastructure developments. Therefore, the infrastructure in 
Brazil is generally not as optimal as it could be and the timeframes of seeing 
structural projects “get out of the paper” and become reality is very long.  
 Angola, although a country that lacks infrastructure in general for its 
population and rural areas, has great infrastructure for catering the oil industry. 
According to a professional from Maersk Drilling, the country focused in 
infrastructure projects in the last five years, in order to support the oil and gas 
sectors properly. Therefore, although the rest of the country still lacks basic 
infrastructure, the offshore industry in itself does not lack appropriate setup. 
 Due to the problems faced by Brazil, the authors ranked the country as 
“Advanced”. The port bottlenecks, the lack of infrastructure and the challenges to 
find local suppliers and constraints in shipyards are some of the issues faced. The 
external assistance in this case would be mostly related in participating in new 
ventures such as the building of the Rio de Janeiro subsea cluster. In the coast of 
Espirito Santo new shipyards are also being developed, but the bureaucratic, 
environmental and legal setbacks delay the projects, according to law professionals 
working directly with the projects.11 
 Angola, in the other hand, would rank as “Standard”, due to the speedier 
supply chain and infrastructure directed to the catering of the oil industry. Those are 
also the reasons why the risk related to Angola’s infrastructure is fairly low and the 
manageability quite high, as many of the infrastructure projects target the offshore 
sector. For Brazil, however, the risk becomes medium and the manageability low, as 
the infrastructure projects usually undergo slow timelines and there are significant 
losses that could be generated due to lack of infrastructure or port bottlenecks. 
Trade 
 International trade may be an interesting factor to take into consideration 
when moving abroad if an offshore company is also involved in maritime transport 
business.  
                                                
11 Sources asked to remain anonymous. 
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 The decision factor would therefore favor Angola. Even though Brazil boasts 
a higher oil production, the country also has a high level of energy consumption and, 
therefore, imports large amounts of refined oils. The trade portfolio of Brazil is also 
largely more diversified than that of Angola. While crude petroleum only represents 
8.4% of Brazil’s total exports, it represents nearly 98% of the Angolan trade 
portfolio. (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2014) The relative comparative 
advantage of oil exports of Angola in such scenario is much higher, in conclusion.  
 However, the fact that Angolan exports are heavily oil-dependent, but there is 
very little internal consumption may also pose a risk. An increase in oil prices, 
followed by a decrease of global oil imports could be a scenario where oil extraction 
in Angola would see a slow down. This would not be the case of Brazil, as the 
country itself is a consumer and would focus more on its internal oil production 
instead of its imported oil.  
Therefore, a high in oil prices could possibly pose great losses for Angola. 
The trade-dependency, therefore, places Angola in a “Complex” categorization, 
especially due to the fact that this risk is not manageable, so the losses would be 
very large. However, as of the nature of risk, the gains could also be very high, 
when oil trade is at its peak. Brazil, however, places at a “Standard”, since it’s 
internal consumption serves as a counter-balance for oil price fluctuations, 
diminishing risk of gains or losses. The risk in Brazil is, therefore, rather low, and the 
manageability quite high, as both exports and internal production act in favor of the 
country. Angola, on the other hand, has high risk and low manageability. 
Piracy 
 Maritime piracy is a violent, organized crime and it is appointed as a 
transnational issue as ships affected by these illegal activities are considered the 
sovereign territory of the nation whose flag the ship is under. The term "piracy" 
according to the United Nations on Drugs and Crime " encompasses two distinct 
sorts of offences: the first is robbery or hijacking, where the target of the attack is to 
steal a maritime vessel or its cargo; the second is kidnapping, where the vessel and 
crew are threatened until a ransom is paid" (United Nations on Drugs and Crime, 
2009). 
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 Although until recent years this was a phenomenon in decline, the huge 
increase of piracy in the coast of Somalia has raised new concerns about the 
maritime security.  
Location of Actual and Attempted Piracy Attacks  
January - December: 2006 - 2010 
Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Brazil 7 4 1 5 9 
Angola 4 1 2 0 0 
Total Global Attacks 239 263 293 410 445 
Table 7: Location of Actual and Attempted Piracy Attacks (ICC International 
Maritime Bureau, 2010) 
 As illustrated in the table above, the number of piracy attacks in Brazil and 
Angola are not significant and do not provoke an important concern for companies. 
For this reason the authors have categorized this risk as "standard" for both 
countries. In terms of manageability, despite the low probabilities of piracy attacks, 
companies may follow several courses of actions to reduce their vulnerability to 
piracy such as avoid the pirate areas -in case any of the two nations would become 
more prone to this type of crime, or enhance vessel security. Thus, the 
manageability is high for the two nations.  
Currency exchange 
 As stated by DOF’s project manager Sigbjørn Stangeland, in one of the 
interviews gathered for this work12, in order to avoid risk many companies opt to 
negotiate part of their contracts in the local currency of the countries they do 
business in. Therefore, the authors decided that it is important to include currency 
exchange fluctuations in the risk assessment. 
                                                
12 Please refer to the DOF case in section 6.1 
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 The main aspect a company should take into account when entering a 
different market is the strength of the currency. In all fairness, in the offshore 
segment most of the contracts will still be negotiated in dollars, but it is important to 
see through that the country is not facing heavy inflation or other issues that may 
lead to abrupt changes in currency. Brazil faced a similar problem in the late 80s 
and early 90s passing through several currency changes, eventually culminating to 
a complete change of currency, instating the real. The main risk in such a process is 
to lose the control of the currency held during an abrupt change, losing capital. 
 Currency fluctuation is interpreted by the authors as an uncertainty in itself, 
due to the external nature of such problem and poses a low and highly manageable 
risk for both countries analyzed in this paper. Due to the fact that currency exchange 
risk can be easily containable, as mentioned before by settling part of the contract in 
local currencies, both countries score as “Standard” in the categorization. The 
losses would be slow when the risk is properly managed. So, to sum up, the risk in 
both countries is rather low and highly manageable. 
Below there are graphic tendencies of the Angolan and Brazilian currencies.  
 
Image 15: Kwanza fluctuation (Transformation Index BTI , 2014) 
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Image 16: Real fluctuation (Trading Economics, 2014) 
Oil Production 
 As mentioned throughout this work, Brazil and Angola both hold high 
expectations in production growth for the following years. The pre-salt discoveries 
are yet to be finished and recently, in May 2014, Brazil discovered a fourth well in 
the Santos basin, pointing towards even more optimistic perspectives in a short and 
medium-term future.  Petrobras also recently reached the mark of 2,8 million boed. 
(Investidor Petrobras, 2014) This volume represents an increase from the previous 
year’s production. It is important to take into consideration that this volume is done 
with low percent of exploration of the pre-salt basins. Therefore, the expectations for 
the country’s production increase are very high and boosted by Petrobras’ optimism. 
The same can be stated for Angola. Boasting currently a production of 1,6 
million bpd, the nation expects to reach 2 million bpd by 2015. (Sonangol, 2014) 
China, Angola’s oil largest importer, has also heavily provided credit to the country.  
Pre-salt reserves’ exploration has already been started and, even though that 
are many challenges in the driven, the commerciality of such oil source has already 
been established. So, in conclusion, although oil production must be seen as an 
uncertainty, the risk of a decrease in production is highly unlikely.  The 
manageability of such risk however, would be very complicated, as it would incur in 
major business losses.  
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This decision problem is rated for both countries as “Standard”. The 
projections of the pre-salt basins explorations are very optimistic and, considering 
the timeframe of the extractions, a decline in oil production is unlikely and therefore, 
poses little threat of losses. The risks of a decline are, therefore, low for both 
countries. However, such risk is hard to manage and would require companies to 
plan strategically over time in case of production decline, scoring as ”Medium”. 
5.3 Summary of Framework 
 Below one will find a summary of the categorization of the decision problems 
presented throughout this section. In order to fully assess the framework, the 
following section will present use cases for both countries, supporting the authors’ 
analysis and findings. 
ANGOLA(
!! Ranking(
!! Standard! Advanced! Complex!
Decision Problems !! !! !!
Project Schedule (Value chain) !! x! !!
Investment: FDI entry modes !! x! !!
Corruption and Transparency 
!
x! !!
Bureaucracy !!
!
x!
Legal System Challenges x! !! !!
Tax Complexities !! x! !!
Financial Sector (Banking system) !! x! !!
Credit ratings x! !! !!
Infrastructure x! !! !!
Legal content and Labor !! !! x!
Trade 
!
!! x!
Political stability !! x! !!
Piracy x!
!
!!
Currency exchange x! !! !!
Oil production x! !! !!
Table 8: Classification of Decision Problems for Angola (Developed by the authors) 
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BRAZIL 
  Ranking 
  Standard Advanced Complex 
Decision Problems       
Project Schedule (Value chain)     x 
Investment: FDI entry modes   x   
Corruption and Transparency x     
Bureaucracy     x 
Legal System Challenges     x 
Tax Complexities     x 
Financial Sector (Banking system) x     
Credit ratings x     
Infrastructure 
!
x   
Local content and Labor     x 
Trade x     
Political stability x     
Piracy x     
Currency exchange x     
Oil production x     
Table 9: Classification of Decision Problems for Brazil (Developed by the authors) 
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6. Application of the Risk Assessment Framework  
6.1 Introduction 
 In this section, two cases, one focusing on Brazil and another focused on 
Angola will be presented. Both cases were written by the authors, taking into 
account literature review on DOF Subsea and Maersk Drilling and interviews 
performed in 2013 and 2014 with one professional from each company.  
Both professionals have had first-hand experience in their respective markets 
and were able to share their experience on-site. The interviews were carried out 
focusing on the risk assessment framework criteria, as means to both verify whether 
the decision problems analyzes were indeed relevant and how such problems 
affected the move overseas for the companies.   
Finally, after describing each case, a presentation of the risk assessment will 
be executed, in order to show how it could be applied in a practical scenario. Due to 
the nature of some information, not all decision problems will be taken into account, 
as sensitive data about each company was not shared during interviews. 
Nonetheless, the authors believe that the cases and their respective examples 
may serve as complete use cases in order to obtain a general idea of how to apply 
the previously proposed framework. 
6.2 DOF Subsea Case 
DOF ASA took its first step towards doing business in Brazil in 2001, 
however it only had its first Brazilian vessel to carry out AH operations in 2005. In 
2006, the company established its local subsidiary, DOF Subsea Brasil and 
completed the building of their first CSV in the country in 2009. Currently the fleet is 
composed by 5 PSV, 9 CSV and 13 AHTS. The company had more than 1,400 
personnel in Brazil and has managed to secure several contracts with Petrobras in 
the recent years. The financial information of the company is presented as part of 
the entire group; the company’s operating income in 2013 was NOK 9,754 million 
with an operating profit EBITDA of NOK 3,111 million. The total market value of their 
fleet, at Q4 2013 was NOK 34,5 billion. (DOF, 2014) 
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The company has pointed out several challenges faced in Brazil, as shown in 
one of their corporate presentation. Amongst them, they highlight: the lack of 
offshore competence in the industry, high turnover, complex tax regime and 
regulations, complex and expensive importation regime, lack of infrastructure, high 
local content requirements, Portuguese language, restrict environmental legislation, 
suppliers and shipyards constraints, visa complexity and union restrictions. 
In order to obtain further information on DOF’s entrance in the Brazilian 
market, the authors performed an interview with Sigbjørn Stangeland, project 
manager for DOF Subsea and one of the professionals working in DOF’s moving 
and operations in Brazil. Stangeland mentioned most of the problems quoted by 
DOF during the interview and developed on his experience while in the country. 
According to Sigbjørn Stangeland the main challenges when establishing an 
office in the country were the complicated laws, governmental regulations and 
supply chain bottlenecks. Stangeland also mentioned that, due to Repetro, there 
was a need to produce vessels in Brazil, to insure local content requirements. The 
certificate that permitted new construction also took a long time to be acquired, 
reinforcing the issues that company face in Brazil with project management time 
lines. He mentioned that the rules were quite different from what was faced in 
Norway and many cultural challenges. 
The language proved to be a barrier as well, as English proficiency in the 
country is very low and most of the laws, regulations and contracts were in 
Portuguese. Petrobras also issues most of its documents, such as memorandums 
and statements, in Portuguese, making it difficult for international professionals to 
understand immediate impacts.  
Stangeland also pointed to the existence of agencies that regulated certain 
professions, such as Engineers (namely CREA). The consequence was that many 
professionals from other countries could not exercise their professions in Brazil 
without obtaining permission from a Brazilian education institution. This required 
time, effort and, in some cases, a knowledge of Portuguese, as many of the 
required courses were not taught in foreign languages. 
  77 
Other cultural business differences faced were the salaries and availability of 
qualified labor. Technical skilled employees were lacking in the country, and the 
necessity to fulfill the local content requirements in hiring forced DOF and other 
companies to perform trainings to meet governmental standards and have the 
necessary labor force.  
Furthermore, the big salary gap was very different from what their experience 
in Nordic markets. Lower qualified employees had much lower salaries than in 
Norway, for example. However, highly qualified positions or higher positions that 
had few applicants demanded very high salaries, much above the Norwegian 
salaries for the same position. Stangeland said that these issues, alongside the 
existence of many regulations and demand from labor unions, were a big cultural 
shock for DOF managers. 
Another issue they faced was currency effects. As the real faced a lot of 
fluctuation, restricting business to dollars eventually resulted in losses. In order to 
avoid such losses, Stangeland affirms that part of the contract is negotiated in 
Brazilian reais, as a risk mitigation strategy. 
During the first years of their operations, according to Stangeland, the 
company was careful about sending more vessels to Brazil. As he stated, the return 
of investments were not as high as expected. He would not mention when the 
business in Brazil became profitable, but did affirm that DOF operated in Brazil at a 
loss for some years.   
Stangeland affirmed that he believes Brazil will have to become more 
competitive in terms of regulations and local content requirements. He compared 
the current situation in Brazil to that of Norway’s local content regulations in the 
1970s. The foundation and empowering of the Norwegian Ship-owners Association 
eventually out conquered the “sleeping pillow” situation13, affirmed Stangeland. In 
his opinion, some player in Brazil will have to assume such responsibility in order to 
stimulate growth and make the market easier to succeed in. 
                                                
13 In Norwegian a “sleeping pillow” is an expression used to refer to situations where many professionals say 
they will do something to solve a certain problem, without really doing nothing about the matter. 
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The project manager also mentioned that shipping licenses, from ANTAQ, 
cost a “fortune” in Brazil and the need for local specialized consulting services “kills 
the incentives to enter Brazil for smaller companies”. Stangeland estimated a need 
of a fleet of 5-6 vessels minimum to justify the cost of using such services. He 
added that all the difficulties with language and the need to use third party 
professional services gives a feeling of lack of control of what they are doing 
occasionally.  
Amongst other challenges, the project manager also mentioned that the 
second hand vessel market in Brazil is “rough” and that handling big projects in 
Brazil occasionally led to a drop in shares prices.  
Finally, when asked to do a comparison with the African markets, especially 
Angola, Stangeland stated that the existence of “international bases” in such 
countries has helped making it easier to do business for foreign companies. 
To sum up, Stangeland’s overview of Brazil focused mostly in the challenges 
faced and overcome by DOF, as well as some difficulties many companies still face 
in Brazil. The DOF story reflects that of many other foreign offshore companies: 
Brazil is a very difficult market, but it is also one of “the” markets to be operating in 
at the present. Therefore, most offshore companies choose to move to Brazil, 
despite all challenges. 
Based on the interview with Stangeland, the framework will be applied taking 
into account the interviewees’ comments about each decision problem. The idea is 
to analyze how the framework could have mitigated risk and whether the authors’ 
categorization of each decision problem is accurate according to what DOF 
experienced in the country. Please refer to the end of this section to have access to 
the final table with the findings. 
Overall, the application of the framework showed that indeed the decision 
problems’ categorization performed by the authors was valid for Brazil and 
highlighted the key issues DOF Subsea faced in their experience in the country. 
Therefore, the validity of the framework is proven in a use case. Furthermore, the 
classification showed that DOF had indeed to seek for external guidance in many of 
the cases suggested by the authors throughout Section 5. 
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The main difference between the framework suggested and DOF’s 
experience lays in the “Corruption” category. More than one DOF professional 
interviewed 14 confirmed having been exposed to corruption in Brazil and that, in 
some cases, there was a need of external assistance for advice on how to deal with 
such situations. 
As mentioned by the interviewee, the problems were overcome by DOF, but 
many were unexpected and the company had to take a proactive initiative towards 
facing them. The advices given for companies are to not underestimate the 
challenges narrated by experienced professionals and have a “significant” size of 
business before entering Brazil, in order to endure the difficulties of the low supply 
chain while establishing.  
   
 
                                                
14 The authors also had access to DOF professional during a company presentation that took place in the 
Norwegian School of Economics in November 2013. 
BRAZIL – DOF Subsea Use Case 
Decision Problems Ranking Argument Comment 
 Standard Advanced Complex  From Interviewee 
Project Schedule (Value chain) 
  
x 
DOF was a very large group before 
entering Brazil and hired specialized 
external help. 
Companies have to be “big enough” 
before considering the Brazilian market. 
The supply chain was slower than 
predicted. 
Investment: FDI entry modes 
 
x 
 
DOF established the DOF Brasil 
Group fiver years after starting to do 
business in Brazil. 
The creation of the Brazilian subsidiary 
was key in the process of establishing a 
business foundation in the country. 
Corruption and Transparency 
 
x 
 
Brazil’s corruption level was different 
from that experienced in Norway and 
did pose challenges for DOF in 
certain cases. 
Only faced corruption at a personal level 
when stopped by police at traffic. Also 
narrated that other colleagues mentioned 
seeing  
Bureaucracy 
  
x DOF has a law office specialized in 
Maritime Law that represents the 
DOF Brasil Group in its Brazilian 
Activities 
External law counseling was extremely 
needed. 
Legal System Challenges 
  
x 
Tax Complexities 
  
x 
Financial Sector (Banking system) x 
  
This was not a key factor for DOF. - 
Credit ratings x 
  
This was not a key factor for DOF. - 
Infrastructure 
 
x 
 
DOF faced big challenges with lack 
of infrastructure and difficulty in 
finding suppliers. 
Interviewee mentioned poor condition 
and mentioned that foreign companies 
join ventures to build subsea clusters in 
order to overcome setbacks from lack of 
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structure. 
Local content and Labor 
  
x 
Along with other foreign companies, 
DOF started a program to train low-
income teenagers for an offshore 
career. To understand and meet the 
local content requirements, there 
was also need for specialized 
consultancies 
The salary differences and the lack of 
qualified trained personnel for technical 
levels was the biggest challenge. 
Language was also an unexpected 
challenge, as Portuguese is a need. The 
interviewee learned the language while in 
Brazil. 
Trade x 
  
DOF was not influenced by trade 
patterns 
- 
Piracy x 
  
DOF was not affected by piracy 
in Brazil. 
- 
Political stability x 
  
DOF was not affected by political 
instabilities. 
The interviewee briefly commented 
on protests taking place in Brazil. 
Currency exchange x 
  
There was no need for external 
assistance. 
Part of contracts was dealt in local 
currency. 
Oil production 
x 
  
DOF entered Brazil previous to 
pre-salt findings but experienced 
deep growth by winning pre-salt 
related contracts.   
The growth of DOF’s fleet in Brazil 
was mainly due to the discovery of 
pre-salt. 
Table 10: Classification of Decision Problems adapted to DOF Subsea case
6.3 Maersk Drilling 
Maersk drilling is one of the five core business areas of A.P. Moller - Maersk 
Group - a worldwide organization with roughly 110,000 employees and present in 
130 countries. Maersk drilling is a drilling rig operator headquartered in 
Copenhagen, Denmark. The drilling company owns and operates 26 offshore drilling 
units, including 6 ultra harsh environment jack-ups, 4 harsh environment jack-ups, 2 
premium jack-ups, 3 ultra deep-water semi-submersibles, 1 mid-water semi-
submersible and 10 drilling barges (Maersk Drilling Facts and Figures, 2014). 
According to the company's annual report 2013, their revenue in 2013 was USD 
1,972 millions with an operating profit EBITDA of USD 863 millions. 
 Maersk Drilling has been operating offshore in Angola since 2012, however 
A.P. Moller - Maersk Group entered the country in 2005 with their subsidiary Maersk 
Oil, providing insights about the market situation to Maersk drilling. In order to gain a 
better understanding of the company's operation in Angola, the authors performed 
an interview to a team member in Maersk drilling, however the employee requested 
to stay anonymous during the development of the case. Hence the authors will 
denote this person through out the case study as Ismael. 
 The authors initiated the interview by asking how did Maersk Drilling 
approach the market and their entry strategy? According to Ismael, the company 
evaluated the market entry options within joint venture, offering services from the 
HQ or establishing a branch in the country. We decided that due to the value of the 
brand, a joint venture was not of a great interest, mainly because Maersk is already 
a known brand and we wanted to have full control of operations in the area. In 
addition, the market forecast showed a great potential for the future, so we saw it as 
a long-term investment for the company. 
 The interviewer continued by pointing out that compared to the situation of 
Angola is much different to how it was five years ago, as the level of infrastructure 
has improved dramatically, therefore companies do not need to make high 
investments in this matter. According to Ismael, Maersk drilling currently has 
operations in 14 countries, which 9 of them are in developing countries. Many of 
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these nations have inserted local content requirements into the governmental and 
regulatory frameworks. Angola is no exception to this rule, as the country's local 
content requirement specifies 70% local staffing.  
 One of the biggest challenge for Maersk drilling, was the labor force status, 
as quoted by Ismael "Angola has been in a civil war for many years, hence the labor 
force in the country is very tiny, and most of them do not stay in a job for a long 
time. Part of the deals companies make with the government is to bring incentives to 
the Angolan labor force and you have to be ready to train people, as even though at 
the beginning you can bring expats, the number of those expats will be limited after 
a couple of years".  
 Despite the difficulties to recruit enough skilled employees, Maersk drilling 
has developed an “Angolanisation” 3-year plan focused on training, educating and 
employing local talent. The target is to reach 3,000 new employees by 2018 says 
Ismael15. 
 In terms of wages, Ismael points out that Luanda is a very expensive city for 
foreigners, hence there is a great difference of wages between wages for expats 
and local employees, as the first ones receive a higher salary. Yet, the visa 
application poses a troublesome challenge, as obtaining work permit for non-locals 
employees is a difficult and lengthy process. 
 Contrary to Angola's neighboring countries, the language is not a significant 
barrier, as Ismael explains "Due to the civil war a lot of Angolans moved to other 
Botswana, Namibia and South Africa where the language was English or French, so 
for companies is pretty confortable as they can run their businesses in English".  
 Another issue the authors inquired is how the company manages corruption, 
as according to the findings, corruption is among the greatest constraints for 
business operations in the country. Ismael affirms that Maersk Drilling has a 
rigorous anti corruption policy, and despite the existence of corruption in Angola, it is 
                                                
15 3000 new employees represent the growth of employees for Maersk Drilling global. According to 
the sustainability report Maersk Drilling 2013, the total number of employees is 4029, out of which 
3% hold Angolan nationality. 
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perfectly possible to have contracts accepted by the government without improper 
payments or unethical behavior. Yet, governmental bureaucracy has been a 
constraint for the business operations, mainly due to all the processes required to 
start operating in the country. 
 Furthermore, in terms of sustainability, engaging with the local stakeholders 
and create programs for community development has been an important approach 
for Maersk Drilling. Ismael states that in partnership with UNICEF, they have 
provided training to 50 Angolan community health workers. Due to this work, they 
received acknowledgement from the authorities for their constructive approach to 
local content and investing in community development. "Constant dialogue with the 
government is a huge asset for us" says Ismael. 
 Finally, the authors asked if he could give any advices to future companies 
considering entering the Oil business in Angola: what would be your advice? In 
order to have a smoothly entry to the country, for the governmental procedures, it is 
very important for companies to submit all their information in Portuguese and to 
have expert people in the language to ensure no delays or rejections in the paper 
work. You also need to submit a detailed plan with the activities the company will 
perform in the country and how you will deal the local content requirements. In other 
words, you need to show the government your commitment of investing in the 
country. 
 Maersk Drilling is expanding its business into new markets in emerging 
economies. In the case of Angola, it is expected that the country may become the 
largest oil producer in the African continent during the next few years. As Ismael 
presented through out the interview, the country poses key challenges such as 
recruiting local people, security concerns, and bureaucratic business environment. 
Ismael finished by adding that "the team in Maersk Drilling in Angola is putting a lot 
of effort into actions that generate shared value and we our plans are to stay in the 
country for years into the future".  
Following the same method applied for the DOF case, based on the interview 
with Ismael, the framework developed in the previous section with be applied to the 
Maersk Drilling case. The intention of this analysis is to observe whether the 
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framework could have mitigated the risk and if the categorization performed by the 
authors, reflects the experience of Maersk Drilling in Angola. Please refer to the end 
of this section to have access to the final table with the findings. 
The main differences between the framework proposed and the experience 
of Maersk Drilling relates to the categories of "Investment: FDI entry mode", "Trade" 
and "Political stability". The first one, is certainly company-specific, as the already 
establish subsidiary "Maersk Oil" provided assistance to "Maersk Drilling", allowing 
the firm a smooth entry to Angola. As per the last two categories, in spite the 
authors assigned a higher risk to both decision problems, the interviewee pointed 
out that Maersk Drilling has not been affected by political situations and regardless 
the fear of the oil prices falling, until now this has not represented an important 
concern for the company.  
In general, applying the framework to the experience of Maersk Drilling in 
Angola showed remarkable similarities to the categorization of decision problems 
performed by the authors, proving the main risk companies could endure in the 
Angolan offshore industry. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANGOLA – Maersk Drilling Use Case 
Decision Problems 
Ranking 
Argument 
Comment 
Standard Advanced Complex From Interviewee 
Project Schedule (Value chain)  x    
 
As one of the core businesses of 
A.P. Moller - Maersk Group, the 
company already had already some 
insights about the Angolan market, 
as Maersk Oil" has been present in 
the country since 2005. 
. 
 Already having some knowledge 
about the country through the 
subsidiary "Maersk Oil" it was "a 
matter of preparing all the paper 
work and detail plan to the 
respective institutions".  
Investment: FDI entry modes x     
Maersk Drilling established a 
subsidiary in Angola and started 
operations in 2012.  
The company decided that due to 
the value of the brand, a joint 
venture was not of a great interest, 
as Maersk Drilling is already a 
known brand and they wanted to 
have full control of operations in the 
area. 
Corruption and Transparency   x   
The high-level of corruption in 
Angola is still a great challenge for 
companies operating in Angola, 
thus firms must follow strict policies 
in order to avoid illegal practices.  
Interviewee affirms the rigorous anti 
corruption policy of Maersk Drilling, 
and despite the existence of 
corruption in Angola, it is perfectly 
possible to have contracts 
accepted by the government 
without improper payments or 
unethical behavior. 
Bureaucracy     x 
As the interviewee pointed out, 
bureaucracy continues to be a 
major constraint for the company’s 
operations 
Governmental bureaucracy has 
been a constraint for the business 
operations, mainly due to all the 
processes required to start 
operating in the country. 
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Legal System Challenges x     
 
The new foreign-exchange 
legislation are difficult to comply, as 
the level of Angola's Banking 
system is underdeveloped 
- 
Tax Complexities   x   
Professional expertise is needed in 
order to avoid wrong 
interpretation/calculations.  
The interviewee mentioned that for 
personal income tax, taxes paid to 
the country by foreigners are 
almost inexistent.  
Financial Sector (Banking system)   x   
Underdeveloped, posing a risk for 
companies as the law stipulates that 
transactions from offshore 
companies must go through 
Angolan banks.  
- 
Credit ratings x     This was not a key factor for Maersk Drilling. - 
Infrastructure x     
Despite the lack of infrastructure in 
Angola, the situation has greatly 
improved after the civil war, and 
since Maersk Drilling did not enter 
the country until 2012, it did not 
posed a major challenge for the 
company. 
Interviewee mentioned that 
compared to the situation of Angola 
to how it was five years ago, as the 
level of infrastructure has improved 
dramatically, therefore companies 
to not need to make high 
investments in this matter.  
Local content and Labor 
    
x 
The biggest challenge for Maersk 
drilling was the labor force status,  
specially because the country's 
local content requirement specifies 
70% local staffing.  
Angola has been in a civil war for 
many years, hence the labor force 
in the country is very tiny, and most 
of them do not stay in a job for a 
long time. Part of the deals 
companies make with the 
government is to bring incentives to 
the Angolan labor force and you 
have to be ready to train people, as 
even though at the beginning you 
can bring expats, the number of 
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those expats will be limited after a 
couple of years.  
Trade   x 
  
 Maersk Drilling was not influenced 
by trade patterns 
The interviewee commented that 
there is an unofficial fear in the 
industry that the oil prices continue 
decreasing, as the oil extraction 
could slow down, however he 
mentions that this could just be a 
momentary situation and that the 
company so far has not faced any 
issues regarding this topic. 
Piracy x 
    
Maersk Drilling was not affected by 
piracy in Brazil. - 
Political stability x 
    
Maersk Drilling was not affected by 
political instabilities. - 
Currency exchange x 
    
Transactions must be made in 
Kwanzas - Angola national 
currency. 
- 
Oil production x 
    
The government of 
Angola has recently put on auction 
10 national oil fields. The country 
plans to increase production from 
1.7mn bpd to 2.2mn bpd in 2018.  
The market forecast showed a 
great potential for the future as 
Angola may become the largest oil 
producer in Africa, so we saw it as 
a long-term investment for the 
company. 
Table 11: Classification of Decision Problems adapted to Maersk Drilling case 
7. Conclusion 
As mentioned previously, the authors believe that the main takeaway of this 
work is to propose a framework for risk assessment upon entering developing 
markets, specifically Brazil and Angola. The choice of the two countries was due to 
the massive opportunities with the pre-salt discoveries. The pre-salt basins attract 
many foreign investments and are definitely one of the most relevant oil discoveries in 
recent years.  
The outlining of a series of decision problems provides individuals from both 
corporate and academic backgrounds with a list of factors that should be taken into 
consideration in order to prepare the company for the internationalization process in 
developing markets. The main purpose of doing such assessment is to mitigate risk, 
thus preventing losses.  
It is important to highlight that each company will have a different risk 
assessment, according to its own characteristics, culture and strategic planning. The 
scenario businesses will face in each country will be location-specific and will be the 
same for all companies.  
However, the actions taken in order to interact within such scenarios will vary 
within different institutions. For example, one specific scenario of high risk can be a 
strategic choice for one company, as they are prepared to tackle such risk and have 
high gains. But the same scenario will not necessarily be optimal for another 
company, even if both firms are in the same sector. Therefore, the framework 
presented is a means of giving companies an overall idea of the challenges one will 
encounter in the Brazilian and Angolan markets, how low or high is the risk 
businesses face, understand the experience of other companies and scholars and, 
finally, how to manage such risk, mitigate it and be successful in their market of 
choice. 
Furthermore, taking risk should not be seen as negative. Low risks that are not 
manageable are more problematic than high risks that also have a high level of 
manageability. One of the best examples presented in this work is the approach to 
project management in Brazil. There is very high uncertainty in this scenario, as 
deadlines are not met and major losses can occur. However, if prepared for such 
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scenario, a company can sustain itself while following the Brazilian pace of business. 
Also, a company should be prepared to hire external qualified assistance that will 
ensure that all legal conditions are met and the process is under control. Taking high 
risk is one of the steps to obtain high returns; therefore, the most important factor to 
take under consideration is whether a specific company would be able to manage the 
risk, regardless of its scale. 
As the authors presented in the introduction, this work intended to start a 
discussion on a fairly new topic. The limitations on the literature available, especially 
in English, pose enormous challenges for many academics that wish to discuss the 
offshore internationalization in emerging markets.  
It is central to remind that this thesis was qualitative, and quantitative data was 
unavailable to the authors. In general, this poses an issue as decision problems had 
to focus on qualitative and strategic challenges of offshore companies moving 
overseas. The authors invite scholars and professionals with access to data to apply 
the framework, taking into account other decision problems such as the time frame to 
break even in an emerging market, the cash flow difficulties and the net present 
values of an internationalization project. In the future, both authors also expect to be 
able to improve the proposed framework and develop it towards a quantitative 
approach. 
The authors also would like to highlight the importance of this work in the field 
of international strategy and cross-cultural management. One of the common 
challenges many companies face is the lack of understanding of cultural differences 
while doing business in different countries. Many theorists such as Michael Porter 
have proposed frameworks in order to assess the internationalization process. The 
authors believe that, even though this is mainly proposed as a risk assessment 
framework, it could also be used from a corporate strategic perspective. In other 
words, this could be an industry-specific international strategy framework, focused on 
risk assessment.  
Overall, the authors believe that this framework will be a great contribution to 
offshore companies seeking to participate in the pre-salt business. It will also be a 
contribution to academics researching developing markets and stimulate further 
production on the topic. The main findings and contributions are the two frameworks 
and categorizations of the decision problems, but the authors believe that there is still 
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many other aspects that can be analyzed and hope that this will become a seminal 
piece as many works on offshore developing markets will follow.  
In order to conclude this assessment, the authors will present a comparison 
between the two countries analyzed throughout this work. Such comparison will focus 
on each country’s particular scenario for the decision problems mentioned in Section 
5, taking into account the risk related to each key issue and the manageability of such 
issue. 
 
Image 17: Angola Risk x Manageability (Developed by authors) 
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 Image 18: Brazil Risk x Manageability (Developed by authors) 
As one may notice in the graph, both countries have differences and similarities 
within their particular risks. The manageability of the risk also differs according to 
each market and the explanation for such reasoning was found throughout Section 5. 
The main intention behind the graphic representation of this comparison is to 
summarize the authors’ findings and provide to the reader a quick assessment of the 
countries’ differences in each criteria.  
The comparison between the two countries shows that the final choice of where 
to move centers on the company assessing its own strengths and weaknesses. As 
mentioned before, knowing the company’s own particularities is the main key to 
applying a risk assessment framework efficiently. 
Finally, the authors believe that both countries definitely pose challenges upon 
entering but also are amazing opportunities for offshore companies. The risk of 
internationalization both carry trials and gains; and the authors hope that this work will 
contribute to companies to engage risk in their strategy and use it wisely in their favor 
when expanding overseas.  
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 APPENDIX A 
Institutions in Brazilian Oil & Gas sector   
 ANP (National regulatory agency): The ANP (Agência Nacional de Petróleo, 
Gás e Biocombustíveis) is the National Regulatory Agency of Oil, Gas and Biofuels. 
The agency was founded following the law n0 2.455 of January 14th of 1998. ANP 
promotes the bidding rounds and administrate contracts representing the union of 
concessionaries in E&P activities.  
 IBP (Brazilian Petroleum Institute):  IBP (Instituto Brasileiro de petróleo, Gás e 
Biocombustíveis) is a private organization with an estimated of 230 associated 
companies. The objective of IBP is to develop the national sector of oil and gas by 
increasing competitiveness, sustainability, ethics and social responsibility. (Scottish 
Enterprise, SDI and Subsea UK, 2012) 
ONIP (National Organisation of the Petroleum Industry):  ONIP (Organização 
Nacional da Indústria do Petróleo) is a national organization that act as an betwen 
companies, suppliers and government institutions within the oil sector with the main 
purpose to enhance competitiveness within the sector.  
 ABPIP (National Association of Independent Producers of Oil and Gas): 
ABPIP (Associação Brasileira de Produtores Independentes de Petróleo e Gás) the 
main objective of this agency is to promote, defend and stimulate the development of 
E&P activity of oil and gas in Brazilian basins. ABPIP as an association represents 
and defends the consolidation of the independent producer segment by working to 
eliminate obstacles as well as incentivising policies for smaller and medium sized 
companies. (Scottish Enterprise, SDI and Subsea UK, 2012) 
 MME (Ministry of Energy & Mining): MME (Ministério das Minas e Energia) as 
a ministry regulates the oil and gas market in Brazil. 
CADFOR (Suppliers Registration System): CADFOR (Cadastro de 
Fornecedores) is a system created by ONIP in collaboration and with the major oil 
companies operating in Brazil (Scottish Enterprise, SDI and Subsea UK, 2012). The 
goal of CADFOR is to obtain qualified information about suppliers of goods and 
services operating in the oil industry. Before becoming a member CADFOR supplier’s 
list, the firm must first be qualified by the ONIP oil and gas requirements. 
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APPENDIX B 
Corporate and Shareholders’ Taxation 
 Profits, income and capital gains earned worldwide by Brazilian tax residents 
are subject to Brazilian corporate income taxes: 
 Brazilian corporate income tax (IRPJ - Imposto de Renda sobre Pessoa 
Jurídica): is a corporate revenue tax that applies to the net profits of any legal entity in 
Brazil. IRPJ is a federal tax paid by public or private legal entities residing in Brazil, 
regardless on their purposes or nationality. This taxes 25% on the net taxable income 
(it is applied at a basic rate of 15%, plus a surtax of 10% on the annual income that 
exceeds R$ 240,000.00 per year or R$ 20,000.00 per month) (Mello, 2012). 
 Social contribution on net profits (CSLL - Contribuição Social sobre o Lucro 
Líquido): this tax is a contribution destined to finance the Brazilian social security 
system and its payment is required from every legal person resident in Brazil. Any 
corporation that is incorporated in the country must contribute. The CSLL is levied on 
net profit at a rate of 12% for financial institutions and 9% for other institutions (Mello, 
2012). 
 Dividend distributions from Brazilian companies are currently tax exempted. 
Capital gains earned by non-residents on the sale of investments in Brazil are subject 
to withholding income tax at a general 15% rate (25% rate if the gain is registered by 
a company located in a tax heaven jurisdiction). 
 Remittance of interests and royalties to non-residents, as a general rule is also 
subject to withholding income tax at a general 15% rate (25% rate if the beneficiary is 
a company located in a tax heaven jurisdiction). 
Goods Accepted Under the REPETRO Law: 
As of today, there is a huge controversy between the government and the companies 
about which goods are subject to the system of temporary admission under the 
REPETRO law. However the SRF Normative instruction no. 87/00 has disclosed a list 
of goods that are subject to acceptance by REPETRO. The following are the main 
goods accepted under REPETRO: 
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1. " Vessels designed for research and production activities in oil or natural gas 
deposits and designed for support and storage in said activities; 
2. Machines, devices, instruments, tools and equipment designed for research 
and production activities in oil and natural gas deposits; 
3. Rigs for the drilling and production of oil or natural gas, as well as those 
designed to provide support for said activities; 
4. Automotive vehicles assembled as machines, devices, instruments, tools and 
equipment designed for research and production activities in oil and natural 
gas deposits; 
5. Structures designed for supporting rigs" (LDC Comex 360°: Solução integrada 
para gestão de regimes aduaneiros) 
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APPENDIX C 
How to obtain a license in Angola and the Oil concession: 
Prospecting license 
 Companies seeking to initiate operations in Angola may apply to the Minister 
of Petroleum for them to issue a prospecting license, which is to determine the oil 
potential of a given area. The prospective license is given for a maximum term of 
three tears. The right of this license is not exclusive to the firm whom the license was 
granted. According to the law, the data produced by the firm carried out under the 
prospecting license are state property and may be used by the National 
Concessionaire Sonangol.  
Petroleum concession 
 Furthermore, firms interested in applying for al oil concession in Angola 
territory (excluding the application for a prospecting license described above) must 
join with the National Concessionaire Sonangol Prior to the association, the 
government analysis the firms' competences, technical and financial capacities and 
may lead to one of the three following types of association: 
1. The incorporation of the firm to the National Concessionaire 
2. A consortium agreement 
3. A production sharing agreement 
 The terms of the concession, periods and phases of the oil extraction are 
defined in the concession decree. Decree 48/06, of September 1.2009, establishes 
the rules and procedures of public tenders to undertake petroleum operations in 
Angola. According to this decree, the principle of public tender also applies to the 
contracts of service and procurements required to perform oil operations. 
 On the other side, when the interested party to associate with a foreign 
company is the National Concessionaire, the Ministry of Petroleum in Angola issues a 
public call for tenders to select the companies most suitable to associate with 
Sonangol for the oil exploration and production in a specific area. Direct negotiation 
with the National Concessionaire may only occur if there is a lack of tenders, or the 
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companies applying do not cover all the necessary requirements (The International 
Energy Agency (IEA), 2006) 
 The concession can be terminated by different manners, either due to an 
agreement between the government and the National Concessionaire, termination of 
the contract, or due to lack of technical or economic feasibility of oil production in the 
area of concession.16 
 
 
  
                                                
16 According to the Decree 1/09 of January 27, the extermination of the concession may also occur due 
to the following reasons: i) Abandonment of the oil field by the foreign firm without previous 
authorization of the Minister of Petroleum. ii) Extraction of any mineral not covered by the concession 
contract 
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APPENDIX D 
Brazil 
 
Angola 
